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Abstract: The main aim of this paper is to cast light on the case law on direct effect
of directives, which has remained elusive to both scholars and practitioners. To this
end, we first revisit the relevant case law on inverse vertical, horizontal. and tri-
angular disputes to show that the fundamental distinction drawn by the case law is
that between ‘direct obligations’ and ‘mere adverse repercussions’. Subsequently, we
propose a doctrinal approach to distinguish between ‘direct obligations’ and ‘mere
adverse repercussions’ which centres on the impact of invoking a Euorpean Union
(EU) directive on the norms governing the dispute. This ‘normative impact theory’
explains all existing case law on the direct effect of directives, and thus aids a better
understanding of the concept of imposing obligations on individuals. We compare
this theory with other doctrinal theories that have purported to explain the case law,
including the well-known distinction between invocabilite´ de substitution and invoc-
abilite´ d’exclusion, concluding that the normative impact theory has descriptive and
normative advantages over existing approaches. Lastly, we show how the function-
ing of the preliminary reference procedure has affected the development of the case
law on direct effect. We demonstrate that the European Court of Justice (ECJ)
applies a presumption that consistent interpretation is capable of remedying incom-
patibilities between national and EU law. Secondly, we show how the formulation
of the preliminary reference can substantially affect, and even confuse, the answer of
the ECJ as regards matters of direct effect.
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I. Introduction
European Union (EU) law scholars are well acquainted with the lights and
shadows of the doctrine of direct effect.1 Despite Pescatore’s well-known
claim that direct effect is an ‘infant disease’ of European law,2 questions of
direct effect continue to arise, particularly in the context of directives.3 The
main aim of this paper is to cast light on a specific aspect of this doctrine: the
elusive distinction between obligations and mere adverse repercussions with a
view to the invocability of directives.
After many attempts to reconcile the alleged incongruences in the case law on
direct effect of directives, and numerous categories and distinctions including
not only vertical and horizontal direct effect, but also inverse vertical direct
1 See by way of introduction, in English eg JA Winter, ‘Direct Applicability and Direct Effect: Two
Distinct and Different Concepts in Community Law’ (1972) 9 CML Rev, 425; P Pescatore, ‘The
Doctrine of “Direct Effect”: An Infant Disease of Community Law’ (1983) 8 European Law Review
155; S Prechal, ‘Does Direct Effect Still Matter?’ (2000) 37 CML Rev, 1047; JM Prinssen and A
Schrauwen (eds), Direct Effect. Rethinking a Classic of EC Legal Doctrine (Europa Law Publishing,
2002); B de Witte, ‘Direct Effect, Primacy, and the Nature of the Legal Order’ in P Craig and G de
Bu´rca (eds), The Evolution of EU Law, 2nd edn (Oxford University Press, 2011); R Schu¨tze, ‘Direct
Effects and Indirect Effects’ in R Schu¨tze and T Tridimas (eds), Oxford Principles of European Union
Law, vol 1 (Oxford University Press, 2018); in French eg L-J Constantinesco, L’applicabilite´ directe
dans le droit de la CEE (LGDJ, 1970); R Kovar, L’applicabilite´ directe du droit communautaire
(Clunet, 1973); P Pescatore, ‘L’effet des directives communautaires: une tentative de de´mythifica-
tion’ [1980] Recueil Dalloz, 171; C Haguenau, L’application effective du droit communautaire en droit
interne. Analyse comparative des proble`mes rencontre´s en droit francais, anglais et allemand (Bruylant,
1995); D Simon, Le syste`me juridique communautaire (3rd edn, PUF, 2001), 383–469; in German eg
U Everling, ‘Zur direkten innerstaatlichen Wirkung der EG-Richtlinien’ in B Bo¨rner (ed.), Einigkeit
und Recht und Freiheit: Festschrift fu¨r Karl Carstens zum 70. Geburtstag (Heymanns, 1984); U
Haltern, Europarecht: Dogmatik im Kontext (2nd edn, Mohr Siebeck, 2007), 314–87; C
Wohlfahrt, Die Vermutung unmittelbarer Wirkung des Unionsrechts (Springer, 2015); in Italian eg
A La Pergola, ‘Il giudice costituzionale italiano di fronte al primato e all’effetto diretto del diritto
comunitario: note su un incontro di studio’ [2003] Giurisprudenzia costituzionale, 2432; G Tesauro,
Diritto dell’Unione Europea (CEDAM, 2012), 161–182; M Distefano (ed.), L’effetto diretto delle fonti
dell’ordinamento giuridico dell’Unione europea (Editoriale Scientifica, 2017); in Dutch eg JM
Prinssen, Doorwerking van Europees recht. De verhouding tussen directe werking, conforme interpretative
en Europeesrechtelijke overheidsaansprakelijkheid (Kluwer, 2004); JH Jans, S Prechal, and RJGM
Widdershoven, Inleiding tot het Europees bestuursrecht (Ars Aequi, 2016), 67–88. For an analysis
of the doctrine of direct effect as a means to ensure the full effectiveness of EU law, see S Seyr, Der
effet utile in der Rechtsprechung des EuGH (Duncker & Humblot, 2008), 122–33; and D
Leczykiewicz, ‘Effectiveness of EU Law before National Courts: Direct Effect, Effective Judicial
Protection, and State Liability’ in D Chalmers and A Arnull (eds), The Oxford Handbook of
European Union Law (Oxford University Press, 2015), both with further references.
2 Pescatore, ‘The Doctrine of “Direct Effect”’ (n 1).
3 Among other questions surrounding the doctrine of direct effect are the invocability of general
principles of EU law and provisions of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union
[2016] OJ C202/02 (Charter) against private parties. See eg Mangold C-144/04, EU:C:2005:709;
Ku¨cu¨kdeveci v Swedex C-555/07, EU:C:2010:21; Association de me´diation sociale C-176/12,
EU:C:2014:2; Dansk Industri C-441/14, EU:C:2016:278; Egenberger v Evangelisches Werk fu¨r
Diakonie und Entwicklung C-414/16, EU:C:2018:257; Stadt Wuppertal v Bauer C-569/16,
EU:C:2018:871. The (horizontal) invocability of general principles and fundamental rights of
EU law is beyond the scope of this article.
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effect, triangular situations, ‘incidental effects’, invocability of substitution and
invocability of exclusion, the academic consensus seems to be that it is impos-
sible to come up with a theory of direct effect of directives which accurately
describes the case law.4
The central aim of this article, however, is to provide such a theory by em-
phasising the ‘normative impact’ of invoking a directive. This ‘normative impact
theory’ is capable of explaining the Court’s case law on direct effect of directives,
and arguably is also normatively more desirable than existing theories. Thus, this
theory not only solves a longstanding puzzle in EU legal doctrine,5 it can also
help courts, practitioners, and scholars better understand the direct effect of
directives, which remains a persistent problem—particularly in—although not
limited to6—EU environmental law.7 Indeed, the complexity of the myriad
issues surrounding the invocability of EU norms is not unknown to the
Court, which has often been confronted with difficult questions on the invoc-
ability of EU norms, forcing it to navigate between providing satisfactory out-
comes in individual cases and creating a consistent, predictable, and
understandable jurisprudence. As Koen Lenaerts and Tim Corthaut observe,
further theory building on the invocability of EU norms could guide the
Court in preliminary reference proceedings, where its case law increasingly re-
veals this concept’s impact on the outcome of individual cases.8
Notwithstanding the explanatory force of the normative impact theory, it is
clear that the existing case law is rife with confusion, which may partly be the
result of the functioning of the preliminary reference procedure. Further guid-
ance by the Court itself would thus be welcomed, for which the normative
impact theory to direct effect can be of assistance.
In order to properly introduce our doctrinal construction of the case law, this
article is divided in two. In the first part, we set the context by revisiting the
development of the case law and the main existing theories of direct effect in
general and of directives in particular (Sections II–IV). Secondly, we introduce a
theory that explains the alleged incongruences of the case law and how the latter
4 See eg M Dougan, ‘When Worlds Collide! Competing Visions of the Relationship between Direct
Effect and Supremacy’ (2007) 44 CML Rev, 931, 963.
5 We refer to A von Bogdandy and J Bast, Principles of European Constitutional Law (Hart Publishing,
2009), 356–7: ‘The biggest hurdle still to be overcome by legal doctrine is to come up with clear
criteria for demarcating the boundary between a (non recognised) horizontal direct effect and a
(recognised) indirect imposition of burdens in triangular situations’.
6 See eg Portga´s C425/12, EU:C:2013:829; and Smith v Meade and Others C-122/17,
EU:C:2018:631.
7 Salzburger Flughafen C-244/12, EU:C:2013:203; Stadt Wiener Neustadt C-348/15,
EU:C:2016:882. On the obligation of national authorities to ensure the full effectiveness of the
Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA) Directive (Directive 2011/92/EU on the Assessment of the
Effects of Certain Public and Private Projects on the Environment [2012] OJ L26/1), see also
recently, Comune di Castelbellino C-117/17, EU:C:2018:129.
8 K Lenaerts and T Corthaut, ‘Towards an Internally Consistent Doctrine on Invoking Norms of EU
Law’ in S Prechal and B van Roermund (eds), The Coherence of EU Law: The Search for Unity in
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is influenced by the functioning of the preliminary reference procedure (Sections
V–VI).
More specifically, this article is structured as follows. First, we introduce the
various theories on direct effect, with particular focus on doctrinal explanation
of the case law on the horizontal direct effect of directives (Section II). Secondly,
we clarify the case law on the invocability of directives, which has remained
elusive notwithstanding much doctrinal work in the 1990s and 2000s, by put-
ting the distinction between ‘mere adverse repercussions’ and ‘direct obligations’
in the spotlight (Section III). Whilst this analysis includes revisiting some well-
known cases, it is necessary because the existing literature has focused mainly on
horizontal direct effect,9 thus missing the jurisprudential image that emerges
from the case law as a whole. Thirdly, we show how the existing theories of the
direct effect of directives are incapable of recognising the distinction between
direct obligations and mere adverse repercussions (Section IV). Fourthly, we
provide a doctrinal construction of this case law,10 focusing on the ‘normative
impact’ of the invocability of EU directives, which explains how the Court
distinguishes mere adverse repercussions from direct obligations (Section V).
We conclude that the normative impact theory is descriptively more accurate
and normatively more desirable than the existing theories. Fifthly, in Section VI
we explain how the functioning of the preliminary reference procedure has
affected the development of the understanding of the case law on direct
effect, mainly through an implicit presumption of the possibility of consistent
interpretation in the absence of a specific question on direct effect, in line with
the Court’s so-called ‘stone-by-stone approach’ (Section VI.A),11 but also
through the fact that the Court is always guided—and sometimes potentially
taken off course—by the information supplied by the referring national court
(Section VI.B). Section VII concludes.
9 But see on inverse vertical direct effect eg A Arnull, ‘Having your Cake and Eating it Ruled Out’
(1988) 13 European Law Review, 42; and S Richter, ‘Die unmittelbare Wirkung von EG-Richtlinien
zu Lasten einzelner’ [1988] Europarecht, 394; and on triangular situations eg D Simon, ‘Effet direct
et primaute´. Dans des “situations triangulaires”, l’effet “collateral” ne fait pas obstacle a` l’effet direct
vertical des directives’ (2004) 63 Europe, 12; M Hofsto¨tter, ‘The Old Lady and the Quary, oder: Frau
Wells, ihr Haus, der Steinbruch und das Gemeinschaftsrecht—Eine Dreiecksgeschichte’ [2004]
European Law Reporter, 276; K Fischer and T Fetzer, ‘Bloße negative Auswirkungen auf die
Rechte Dritter stehen einer unmittelbaren Wirkung von Richtlinien im Dreiecksverha¨ltnis nicht
entgegen’ [2004] EWS: Europa¨isches Wirtschafts- & Steuerrecht, 236; HFMW van Rijswick and
RJGM Widdershoven, ‘Rechtstreekse werking van richtlijnen in driehoeksverhoudingen’ [2004]
Nederlands tijdschrift voor Europees recht, 42.
10 By doctrinal constructivism we refer to the traditional method of legal science, focusing on
systematising and analysing the case law in light of theory and doctrine. See eg A von Bogdandy,
‘The Past and Promise of Doctrinal Constructivism: A Strategy for Responding to the Challenges
Facing Constitutional Scholarship in Europe’ (2009) 7 International Journal of Constitutional Law,
364; R van Gestel and H-W Micklitz, ‘Revitalizing Doctrinal Legal Research in Europe: What About
Methodology?’ (2011) EUI Working Papers LAW 2011/05; A Somek, The Legal Relation: Legal
Theory after Positivism (Cambridge University Press, 2017), ch 3.
11 K Lenaerts, ‘EU Citizenship and the European Court of Justice’s “Stone-by-Stone” Approach’
(2015) 1 International Comparative Jurisprudence, 1.
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II. Setting the context: direct effect and directives
In Van Gend en Loos, the reasons for the direct effect of Article 12 of the Treaty
establishing the European Economic Community (EEC) given by the Court sug-
gested that directives could never be directly effective, since any rights or obligations
contained in directives are ‘qualified by any reservation on the part of states which
would make its implementation conditional upon a positive legislative measure
enacted under national law’.12 On a strict reading of ‘unconditionality’ as meaning
‘without conditions’, directives would by definition lack unconditionality.
Nonetheless, the Court’s well-known gradual loosening of the conditions of
direct effect has allowed it to accept a direct effect of directives as well, while more
generally, the increasingly lenient test for direct effect has led commentators to
question the relevance of direct effect other than a test of justiciability.13 These
developments need no extensive repetition here.14 In Reyners, the Court held that
Article 52 EEC possessed direct effect, notwithstanding that this provision pro-
vided for the gradual aboliton of all barriers to establishment. Thus, while being
dependent on further implementation, according to the Court Article 52 EEC
had ‘at least a partial direct effect in so far as it specifically prohibits discrimin-
ation on grounds of nationality’.15 A similar approach was taken in Defrenne,
which concerned an obligation for Member States to gradually abolish all forms
of gender discrimination at work by virtue of Article 119 EEC (now 157 of the
Treaty on the Functioning of the EU (TFEU)). The Court identified a directly
effective core right not to be directly discriminated against.16
Meanwhile, direct effect was extended to sufficiently clear and unconditional
provisions of regulations,17 decisions,18 and directives.19 In Van Duyn, the Court
provided three arguments in support of the invocability of unimplemented dir-
ectives against the state: the binding effect of directives pursuant to Article 288
TFEU, the principle of effectiveness, and the non-exclusion of directives from the
preliminary reference procedure.20 Further, Van Duyn made it clear that the
‘unconditionality’ criterion should not be given a strict reading, to the extent
12 Van Gend en Loos, EU:C:1963:1. This suggestion is indeed supported by the text of Art. 288
TFEU which appears to deny directives having effects within the Member States’ legal orders.
13 S Prechal, Directives in EC Law (Oxford University Press, 2005), 240–1; Pescatore, ‘The Doctrine
of “Direct Effect”’ (n 1), 176–7; R Schu¨tze, European Constitutional Law (Cambridge University
Press, 2012), 314.
14 For overviews of the trend from a ‘strict’ to a ‘lenient’ test, see eg Schu¨tze (n 1), 268–70; P Craig
and G de Bu´rca, EU Law: Text, Cases, and Materials (6th edn, Oxford University Press, 2015), 184–
208; de Witte (n 1).
15 Reyners 2/74, EU:C:1974:68, para. 14.
16 Defrenne 43/75, EU:C:1976:56, paras 21–24.
17 Leonesio 93/71, EU:C:1972:39.
18 Grad 9/70, EU:C:1970:78.
19 Van Duyn 41/74, EU:C:1974:133.
20 Ibid para. 12. In Ratti 148/78, EU:C:1979:110, para 22, the Court added a fourth argument,
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that limitations of and exceptions to the main rule do not prevent a provision
from being unconditional insofar as ‘the meaning and exact scope of the provision
raise questions of interpretation, these questions can be resolved by the courts’.21
In light of these developments, Pescatore was the first commentator to ob-
serve that direct effect is simply ‘the normal state of the law’.22 In a mature
legal order, it is obvious that provisions can be relied upon before courts
insofar as they are justiciable,23 meaning that they can be interpreted and
applied by courts.24 The criteria of sufficient precision and unconditionality
embody this requirement.25
This wide interpretation of the doctrine of direct effect is also supported by
judgments such as Becker,26 VNO,27 and Kraaijeveld,28 which conjunctively
suggest that justiciability is a necessary and sufficient condition for EU law
provisions to be invoked before national courts. In Becker, the Court had seem-
ingly taken the view that—following a strict reading of Van Gend en Loos—there
is a link between direct effect and the existence of a subjective right:
[W]herever the provisions of a directive appear, as far as their subject-matter is con-
cerned, to be unconditional and sufficiently precise, those provisions may, in the
absence of implementing measures adopted within the prescribed period, be relied
upon as against any national provision which is incompatible with the directive or in
so far as the provisions define rights which individuals are able to assert against the state.29
While it has indeed been argued that direct effect should be limited to subjective
rights,30 it appears that the word ‘or’ implies that a subjective right is a suffi-
cient, but not a necessary condition in order for an EU provision to have direct
effect.31 Alternatively, it has been argued that the last part of the cited paragraph
is meant to indicate that a subjective right to invoke an EU provision is the
consequence of that provision having direct effect.32 This interpretation has sup-
port in the case law as well.33
21 Van Duyn (n 19) at para. 14. Similarly, for the direct effect of Art. 34 TFEU in light of derogations
provided by Art. 36 TFEU, SpA Sargoil v Italian Ministry of Foreign Trade 13/68, EU:C:1968:54.
22 Pescatore, ‘The Doctrine of “Direct Effect”’ (n 1).
23 Ibid 176–77.
24 For a classic account of the concept of justiciability, see L Fuller, ‘The Forms and Limits of
Adjudication’ (1978) 92 Harvard Law Review, 353.
25 cf Van Duyn (n 19), para. 14; Opinion of AG Jacobs in Lindo¨park C-150/99, EU:C:2000:504,
para. 44.
26 Becker 8/81, EU:C:1982:7.
27 VNO 51/76, EU:C:1977:12.
28 Kraaijeveld C-72/95, EU:C:1996:404.
29 Becker 8/81, EU:C:1982:7, para. 25 (emphasis added).
30 Lenaerts and Corthaut (n 8); K Lenaerts and T Corthaut, ‘Of Birds and Hedges: The Role of
Primacy in Invoking Norms of EU Law’ (2006) 31 European Law Review, 287.
31 See eg Schu¨tze (n 1), 270; and also Prechal (n 13), 231–41.
32 M Ruffert, ‘Rights and Remedies in European Community Law: A Comparative View’ (1997) 34
CML Rev, 307, 319–21.
33 See eg Gloszczuk C-63/99, EU:C:2001:488, para. 38; Barkoci and Malik C-257/99,
EU:C:2001:491, para. 39; Courage v Crehan C-453/99, EU:C:2001:465, paras 26–27. See also J
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Judgments including VNO and Kraaijeveld, in turn, confirm such an ‘object-
ive’ conceptualization of direct effect—in which justiciability is a necessary and
sufficient condition for direct effect—by emphasizing that sufficiently clear and
unconditional provisions which clearly do not confer subjective rights onto
individuals can nonetheless be invoked by individuals against their state.34 In
order to account for these judgments, some commentators—mainly in the
German and Dutch literature—have distinguished between a narrow concept
of ‘subjective direct effect’ and a broader concept of ‘objective direct effect’ to
distinguish between the invocation of an EU provision that confers a subjective
right to individuals (‘subjective direct effect’) and the invocation of an EU
provision which does not confer any rights to individuals but which imposes
an obligation onto national judicial and administrative authorities to apply this
provision (‘objective direct effect’).35
In line with Pescatore’s ‘infant disease’ conception of direct effect, it seems
however that most authors see the possibility to invoke any sufficiently precise
and unconditional provision of EU law before national courts as further evi-
dence that direct effect is merely a matter of justiciability.36 The question is
whether this assertion is correct in the context of the direct effect of directives.
Indeed, after the Court had confirmed the invocability of directives by individ-
uals in proceedings against the state in Van Duyn and subsequent cases, in
Marshall it famously observed obiter dictum that the binding nature of directives
exists only in relation to the Member States, and that they can, therefore, only
create rights for individuals—not obligations.37
Accordingly, even if a provision of a directive is sufficiently clear and uncon-
ditional, an individual cannot rely on it against another individual (the
Darpo¨, ‘Pulling the trigger: ENGO standing rights and the enforcement of environmental obliga-
tions in EU law’ in S Bogojevic´ and R Rayfuse (eds), Environmental Rights in Europe and Beyond
(Hart Publishing, 2018), 253.
34 VNO (n 27) paras 23–24; Kraaijeveld (n 28), para. 56.
35 For a brief overview of this distinction, see P Craig and G de Bu´rca, EU Law: Text, Cases, and
Materials (6th edn, Oxford University Press, 2015), 185–6. This discussion is largely, though not
exclusively, the result of the case law on the invocability of the EIA Directive (eg Kraaijveld and
Wells). See eg A Bach, ‘Direkte Wirkungen von EG-Richtlinien’ (1990) Juristenzeitung, 1108; A
Epiney, ‘Unmittelbare Anwendbarkeit und objektive Wirkung von Richtlinien’ (1996) 111 DVBl,
409; M Pechstein, ‘Die Anerkennung der rein objektiven unmittelbaren Richtlinienwirkung’ (1996)
7 Europa¨isches Wirtschafts- & Steuerrecht, 261; E Klein, ‘Objektive Wirkungen von Richtlinien’ in O
Due, M Lutter, and J Schwarze (eds), Festschrift fu¨r Ulrich Everling (1995). See for analysis also M
Ruffert, ‘Rights and Remedies in European Community Law: A Comparative View’ (1997) 34 CML
Rev, 307, 319–21; and D Edward, ‘Direct Effect, the Separation of Powers and the Judicial
Enforcement of Obligations’ in Scritti in Onore di Giuseppe Federico Mancini. Vol 2: Diritto
dell’Unione Europea (Giuffre`, 1998). Some authors have referred to ‘objective direct effect’ as ‘(ob-
jective) legality control’ to distinguish this situation from ‘direct effect’, eg CWA Timmermans,
‘Noot onder VNO-arrest en ENKA-arrest’ (1978) Ars Aequi, 350; F Amtenbrink and HHB Vedder,
Recht van de Europese Unie (Boom Juridische Uitgevers, 2017), 207–8. For a discussion of the various
views, see Prechal (n 13), 234–7, with further references.
36 See eg Prechal (n 1); Schu¨tze (n 1), 270–1.
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prohibition of horizontal direct effect).38 An explicit call by Advocate General
Lenz to change course and allow for horizontal direct effect of directives was
famously rejected by the Court in Faccini Dori.39 In this case, Ms Faccini Dori
invoked the (unimplemented) Doorstep Selling Directive40 in a dispute against
the street seller who had persuaded her to buy a language course and then
refused to annul the contract a few days later, as it would have been required
to do had Italy implemented the Directive. The Court had no difficulty in
rejecting Ms Faccini Dori’s position. By reference to Marshall, the ECJ shut
the door to horizontal direct effect: ‘a Directive cannot of itself impose obliga-
tions on an individual’.41 Likewise, a Member State cannot rely on a sufficiently
clear and unconditional provision of a directive against an individual (the pro-
hibition of inverse vertical direct effect).42
These two prohibitions appear to be at odds with the thesis that, at least in the
context of directives, the doctrine of direct effect is merely a question of jus-
ticiability. After all, if direct effect can be reduced to justiciability, this would
suggest that sufficiently clear and unconditional provisions from (unimple-
mented) directives should be capable of being invoked even against other indi-
viduals.43 Many proponents of allowing for horizontal direct effect of directives
emphasized that in the ‘ordinary state of the law’ individuals ought to be able to
enforce the rights they would have been granted, had the state correctly imple-
mented the respective directive.44
38 Ibid.
39 Opinion of AG Lenz in Faccini Dori, C-91/92, EU:C:1994:45, paras 43–73; Faccini Dori C-91/
92, EU:C:1994:292, paras 20–25.
40 Council Directive 85/577/EEC of 20 December 1985 to protect the consumer in respect of contracts
negotiated away from business premises [1985] OJ L372/31, now replaced by Directive 2011/83/EU of
the European Parliament and of the Council of 25 October 2011 on consumer rights [2011] OJ L304/64.
41 Faccini Dori (n 39) para. 20.
42 Pretore di Salo` 14/86, EU:C:1987:275; Kolpinghuis 80/86, EU:C:1987:431; Berlusconi and Others
C-387/02, C-391/02, and C-403/02, EU:C:2005:270; Arcaro C-168/95, EU:C:1996:363; and
Portga´s (n 6). Inverse vertical direct effect is also called descendant or downwards direct effect, A
Albors-Llorens, ‘The Direct Effect of EU Directives: Fresh Controversy or a Storm in a Teacup?
Comment on Portga´s’ (2014) 39 European Law Review, 851.
43 The distinction on the (horizontal) direct effect of directives predates Marshall judgment; see eg H
Schermers, ‘Indirect Obligations. Four Questions in Respect of EEC-Obligations arising from
Rights or Obligations of Others’ (1977) 24 Netherlands International Law Review, 260; AJ
Easson, ‘Can Directives Impose Obligations on Individuals?’ (1979) 4 European Law Review, 67.
44 See eg P Manin, ‘L’invocabilite´ des directives; Quelques interrogations’ [1990] Revue Trimestrielle
de Droit Europe´en, 669; F Emmert and M Pereira de Azevedo, ‘L’effet horizontal des directives: La
jurisprudence de la CJCE: un bateau ivre?’ [1993] Revue Trimestrielle de Droit Europe´en, 503; C Boch
and R Lane, ‘European Community Law in National Courts: A Continuing Contradiction’ (1992) 5
Leiden Journal of International Law, 171; T Tridimas, ‘Horizontal Effect of Directives: a Missed
Opportunity?’ (1994) 19 European Law Review, 621, D Kinley, ‘Direct Effect of Directives: Stuck on
Vertical Hold’ (1995) 1 European Public Law, 79.; P Craig, ‘Directives: Direct Effect, Indirect Effect
and the Construction of National Legislation’ (1997) 22 European Law Review, 519.
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While questions of direct effect also continue to arise in the context of pri-
mary law,45 such questions are mainly associated with directives. Looking at the
case law, it appears that the complexity surrounding the direct effect of directives
points to unresolved issues in the invocability of EU law.46 Questions of invoc-
ability encompass not only the justiciability of the provision to be invoked, ie
the objective capacity of that provision to be applied by courts, but also the
question of who is entitled to invoke this provision, against whom it can be
invoked, in addition to various procedural limits to the invocability of legal
norms.
The complexity of the invocability of directives has been further increased by
post-Faccini Dori case law, which has—at least ostensibly—limited the relevance
of the apparent clarity of the prohibitions of horizontal and inverse vertical
direct effect.47 The prohibition of the horizontal direct effect of directives has
been challenged directly by CIA Security and Unilever Italia, also known as the
‘incidental effects’48 case law, in which the Court allowed a private party to rely
45 As to general principles of EU law, see eg n 3 above; as to free movement of goods, see eg Fra.bo C-
171/11, EU:C:2012:453, and see generally, C Krenn, ‘A Missing Piece in the Horizontal Direct
Effect “Jigsaw”: Horizontal Direct Effect and the Free Movement of Goods’ (2012) 49 CML Rev,
177; and LW Gormley, ‘Private Parties and the Free Movement of Goods: Responsible, Irresponsible,
or a Lack of Principles?’ (2015) 38 Fordham International Law Journal, 993); as to the horizontal
direct effect of the fundamental freedoms in general, see eg S Enchelmaier, ‘Horizontality: The
Application of the Four Freedoms to Restrictions Imposed by Private Parties’ in P Koutrakos and
J Snell (eds), Research Handbook on the Law of the EU Internal Market (Edward Elgar, 2017); PC
Mu¨ller-Graff, ‘Direct Horizontal Effect of the Transnational Market Access Freedoms of the Internal
Market’ in F Amtenbrink, G Davies, D Kochenov, and J Lindeboom (eds), The Internal Market and
the Future of European Integration: Essays in Honour of Laurence W Gormley (Cambridge University
Press, 2019). As to public international law, see eg in the context of the Aarhus Convention, Protect
Natur-, Arten- und Landschaftsschutz Umweltorganisation C-664/15, EU:C:2017:987). It might be
argued that questions of direct effect, rather than an infant disease, precisely point at the EU’s
cooperative federal structure and the complex interaction between the EU and national legal
orders, in which effet utile has to be balanced against legality, legal certainty, and judicial legitimacy,
among others. See further J Dickson, ‘Directives in EU Legal Systems: Whose Norms Are They
Anyway?’ (2011) 17 European Law Journal, 190; and on cooperative federalism generally, R Schu¨tze,
From Dual to Cooperative Federalism (Oxford University Press, 2009). This complexity is reinforced
by the relatively high degree of vagueness and indeterminacy in the EU Treaties (including, in this
context, the hermeneutic implications of Art. 288 TFEU). Critical as to the jurisprudence of the
Court from a federal perspective, M Hilf, ‘Die Richtlinie der EG: ohne Richtung, ohne Linie?’
[1993] Europarecht, 1.
46 Lenaerts and Corthaut (n 8).
47 Such developments were already predicted by Frank Emmert in ‘Horizontale Drittwirkung von
Richtlinien?’ (1992) 3 Europaeisches Wirtschafts- & Steuerrecht, 56, who called for overturning
Marshall because he would favour ‘ein Ende mit Schrecken’ [a frightening ending] over ‘ein
Schrecken ohne Ende’ [fright without an ending]. Similarly, Walter van Gerven argued that main-
taining the prohibition of horizontal direct effect would inevitably result in ‘inconsistencies and
inequalities’ in future case law: W van Gerven, ‘The Horizontal Effect of Directive Provisions
Revisited: the Reality of Catchwords’ in D Curtin and T Heukels (eds), Institutional Dynamics of
European Integration. Essays in Honour of Henry G Schermers (Martinus Nijhoff, 1994), 348.
48 The term ‘incidental effects’ was introduced in A Arnull, ‘Editorial: The Incidental Effect of
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on the Notification Directive49 in a horizontal dispute against another private
party.50 Such ‘incidental effects’ were seemingly also allowed for a broader range
of directives.51 In every case where the Court was explicitly asked a question
about the horizontal and inverse vertical effects of directives, however, it re-
sponded by explicitly maintaining the prohibition of horizontal direct effect and
inverse vertical direct effect in other cases,52 causing confusion in the litera-
ture.53 This confusion is especially understandable if chronology is taken into
account. Less than two months before the Court’s judgment in CIA Security, it
had confirmed the prohibition of horizontal direct effect in El Corte Ingle´s.54
As a corollary of the ‘incidental effects’ case law, doubts about the relevance
of the limits concerning the prohibition of inverse vertical direct effect also
arose in ‘triangular situations’, where mere adverse repercussions for third
parties are perceived as side effects of vertical direct effect.55 A prominent
49 Council Directive 83/189/EEC of 28 March 1983 laying down a procedure for the provision of
information in the field of technical standards and regulations [1983] OJ L109/8, now replaced by
Directive (EU) 2015/1535 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 9 September 2015
laying down a procedure for the provision of information in the field of technical regulations and of
rules on Information Society services [2015] OJ L241/1.
50 CIA Security C-194/94, EU:C:1996:172; Unilever Italia SpA C-443/98, EU:C:2000:496.
51 Ruiz Berna´ldez C-129/94, EU:C:1996:143; Bellone v Yokohama SpA C-215/97, EU:C:1998:189;
and Quelle AG C-404/06, EU:C:2008:231; in which the ECJ only examined the substantive ques-
tion of the compatibility of national law with EU law, and the term ‘direct effect’ and related
formulas were not used in either the preliminary questions or the Court’s answers. From a scientific
perspective, the relevance of these cases to a discussion on the horizontal direct effect of directives is
highly questionable. See in this regard also, W van Gerven, ‘Of Rights and Remedies in the
Enforcement of European Community Law before National Courts’ (1997) VIII(1) Collected
Courses of the Academy of European Law, 241, 259–60; J Stuyck, ‘Case Note: El Corte Ingles,
Berna´ldez and Pafitis’ (1996) 33 CML Rev, 1261, 1270; JC Moitinho de Almeida, ‘L’effet direct
des directives, l’interpre´tation conforme du droit national et la jurisprudence de la Cour Supreme de
Justice portugaise’ in N Colneric et al. (eds), Une communaute´ de droit. Festschrift fu¨r Gil Carlos
Rodriguez Iglesias (BWV Berliner Wissenshafts, 2003), 237. See also, in this regard, Smith (n 6), para.
50. We will discuss Ruiz Berna´ldez and Bellone in sections V and VI below in order to illustrate how
the Court works on the basis of the presumption that consistent interpretation is a possible mech-
anism to remedy any incompatibilities between national and EU law.
52 El Corte Ingle´s SA C-192/94, EU:C:1996:88; Pfeiffer and Others C-397/01 to C-403/01,
EU:C:2004:584; Berlusconi (n 42).
53 For analysis see eg C Hilson and T Downes, ‘Making Sense of Rights: Community Rights in EC
Law’ (1999) 24 European Law Review, 121; M Dougan, ‘The “Disguised” Vertical Direct Effect of
Directives?’ (2000) 59 Cambridge Law Journal, 586; M Lenz, D Sif Tynes, and L Young, ‘Horizontal
What? Back to Basics’ (2000) 25 European Law Review, 509; S Weatherill, ‘Breach of Directives and
Breach of Contract’ (2001) 26 European Law Review, 177; T Tridimas, ‘Black, White, and Shades of
Grey: Horizontality of Directives Revisited’ (2002) 21 Yearbook of European Law, 327.
54 Judgment in El Corte Ingle´s was delivered on 7 March 1996; judgment in CIA Security on 30 April
1996.
55 We prefer this concept to that of ‘side horizontal direct effect’ in the context of triangular situ-
ations, because as shown in this case, there may not be a horizontal legal relationship between the
person relying on EU law and the person suffering the mere adverse repercussion of such an action.
For the concept of ‘side horizontal direct effect’ see eg S Prechal, Directives in EC Law (Oxford
University Press, 2005), 261–6. See similarly, C Baldus, ‘Ein weiterer Schritt zur horizontalen
Direktwirkung? Zu EuGH, C-201/02, 7.1.2004 (Delena Wells)’ (2004) 1 Zeitschrift fu¨r
Gemeinschaftsprivatrecht, 124.
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example of such a situation occurs when an individual challenges the validity
of a permit granted by a public authority to an undertaking, as was seen in
Wells.56 Salzburger Flughafen57 and Stadt Wiener Neustadt58 build upon this
line of case law. Together with Portga´s,59 these cases show that the invocability
of directives by public authorities against other public authorities or hybrid
entities puts pressure on existing categories of horizontal and vertical disputes,
as well as the question of who can benefit from invoking directives in light of
the estoppel rule.60 Most recently, in Smith, a judgment delivered on 7 August
2018, the ECJ confirmed the prohibition of the horizontal direct effect of
directives while purporting to synthesize Marshall and the incidental effects
case law.61
In this context of increasingly complex case law, a number of theories have
been developed to try to make sense of the direct effect of directives. In the
remainder of this section, we will briefly summarize the most important at-
tempts in this regard, focusing on their implications for the meaning of the
doctrine of direct effect more generally. First, we look at theories focusing on the
distinction between different factual situations (Section II.A), then on those
focusing on the distinction between direct effect and the scope of application
of a provision (Section II.B), and finally on those distinguishing between sub-
stitutionary and exclusionary effects (Section II.C). Whilst this section will be
confined to describing these theories neutrally, we will return to them in Section
IV below by scrutinizing their explanatory and normative attractiveness in view
of the distinction between ‘direct obligations’ and ‘mere adverse repercussions’
which we regard as the central distinction governing the case law, as discussed in
Section III.
A. Distinguishing between different situations
Some commentators trying to make sense of the ‘incidental effects’ case law have
suggested to distinguish between different ‘situations’ in which direct effect
plays a role. Consequently, the prohibition of horizontal direct effect of direct-
ives may not apply to all situations of invoking a directive in a horizontal
dispute.
56 Wells C-201/02, EU:C:2004:12. The term ‘triangular situation’ was already introduced to qualify
the situation in, among others, Fratelli Costanzo C-103/88, EU:C:1989:256; and World Wildlife
Fund C-435/97, EU:C:1999:418: K Lackhoff and H Nyssens, ‘Direct Effect of Directives in
Triangular Situations’ (1998) 23 European Law Review, 397; D Colgan, ‘Triangular Situations:
The Coup de Graˆce for the Denial of Horizontal Direct Effect of Community Directives’ (2002)
8 European Public Law, 545.
57 Salzburger Flughafen (n 7).
58 Stadt Wiener Neustadt (n 7).
59 Portga´s (n 6).
60 For an analysis of Portga´s, see Albors-Llorens (n 42) and section III below.
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Hilson and Downes aimed at explaining the ‘incidental effects’ case law by
relying on Hohfeld’s theory of rights62 in order to distinguish between two
situations: first, an individual uses direct effect as a ‘sword’ by claiming a sub-
jective right (more precisely using Hohfeld’s terminology, a ‘right’ in the limited
sense of a claim63) from a directive which correlates with an obligation (or, to
use Hohfeld’s terminology, a duty64) on another individual. Secondly, an indi-
vidual can also invoke an EU provision as a ‘shield’ to protect himself from
obligations under conflicting national law. According to Hilson and Downes,
the prohibition of horizontal direct effect would prevent an individual from
invoking a provision from an unimplemented directive insofar as the provision
contains a right in the Hohfeldian sense.65 In cases such as CIA Security no
rights were invoked, because the Notification Directive simply contains neither
rights nor obligations for individuals at all:
CIA was not attempting to assert a positive or claim-right derived from the Directive
against the defendants, who were also individuals. Rather, they were seeking to enforce
a Community law immunity (or negative right) based on the Directive (ie using the
Directive as a ‘shield’), the correlative of which is that the defendants would be under
a disability from relying on the Belgian rules. . . . As a result, CIA were recognised as
enjoying a horizontal immunity (or negative right) vis-a´-vis the counterclaiming com-
pany in this case, despite the orthodox understanding of the absence of horizontal
effect for directives.66
The correlation of this immunity is not an obligation, but a ‘disability’ on the
part of the other individual consisting of the fact that this individual is pre-
vented from relying on national law. Accordingly, a directive can be invoked
even in a horizontal dispute if it is used merely as a ‘shield’ because such a
situation cannot properly be characterized as imposing an obligation on the
other individual.67 By contrast, invoking a directive as a ‘sword’ would be pro-
hibited because invoking the right implies imposing the correlative obligation
on another individual.68 At least with respect to the limits to the invocability of
directives, direct effect would be confined to situations of invoking subjective
rights.69
62 WN Hohfeld, ‘Fundamental Legal Conceptions as Applied in Legal Reasoning’ (1917) 26 Yale
Law Journal, 710.
63 Ibid 717. According to Hohfeld, the word ‘right’ is often used generically and indiscriminately to
indicate any sort of legal advantage. His theory aimed to distinguish between rights in the strict sense
as the correlative of duties, and privileges, powers, and immunities.
64 Ibid 731–2.
65 Hilson and Downes (n 53), 123–4.
66 Ibid 125.
67 Ibid 123–7. See earlier J Coppel, ‘Rights, Duties and the End of Marshall’ (1994), 57 Modern Law
Reviewi, 859.
68 Ibid.
69 Hilson and Downes (n 53), 137–8, noting how the conflation of direct effect and the creation of
rights for individuals is inconsistent with the development in the case law towards allowing for direct
effect for provisions only containing ‘interests’.
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Secondly, in his well-known commentary on the ‘incidental effects’ case law,
Dougan introduced the notion of so-called ‘disguised vertical direct effect’ in
order to conceive of the incidental effects case law as effectively cases involving
vertical direct effect.70 In accordance with this theory, the Court has silently
followed only one part of the calls for horizontal direct effect, namely the
‘extended estoppel theory’: individuals who would have had an obligation if
the directive had been implemented correctly, may not benefit from the failure
of a Member State to do so.71 Dougan distinguishes between two types of
horizontal disputes. In the first situation, only the Member State has actively
breached the directive, while the individual must be regarded as an ‘opportun-
istic passer-by’ who tried to benefit from the Member State’s failure. For in-
stance, the companies concerned in CIA Security and Unilever had not
themselves infringed any EU provision; they merely tried to enforce national
law against CIA Security and Unilever. According to the ‘disguised vertical
direct effect’ theory, this situation is comparable to a Member State trying to
enforce national law which violates a directive against an individual.72 Since, in
such a situation, the individual can invoke the directive against his obligations
under national law, there is no reason why this individual should not also be
allowed to invoke the directive if that national law is enforced by another in-
dividual rather than the Member State itself. Hence,
the position of the private party can be assimilated entirely to that of the defaulting
Member State and therefore subjected to the same rule as regards direct effect without
affecting anything other than the purely factual interests of that individual (CIA
Security; Unilever v Smithkline Beecham; Pafitis). The rationale here seems to be that
not only the guilty public authority but also an opportunistic passer-by should be
prevented from taking advantage of the Member State’s substantive breach of
Community law.73
In the second situation, an individual does not merely try to enforce national
law contravening the applicable directive, but has herself or himself actively
transgressed the substantive obligations contained in the directive. A typical
example is Faccini Dori, where two breaches of the Doorstep Selling Directive
can be distinguished: Italy’s failure to implement the Doorstep Selling Directive,
and the doorstep seller who refused to cancel Ms Faccini Dori’s subscription to
the language course she had purchased:
In this type of case, the interests of the private party are not completely parasitic upon
the conduct of the national authorities; enforcement of the Member State’s obligation
to implement the terms of the directive would necessarily expand upon the private
70 Dougan (n 53).
71 See van Gerven (n 47), 351–3.
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party’s legal responsibilities towards the claimant in respect of its own breach of
Community law.74
B. Distinguishing between the direct effect and the scope of a provision
As a second approach to account for the case law on the direct effect of direct-
ives, some authors have tried to take an interpretive approach to invocability,
focusing on the personal and material scope of provisions. The question of
whether a directive has the ‘effect’ of being applied in a specific procedural
context—a horizontal or a vertical dispute—should be distinguished from the
question of whether this directive includes in its personal and material scope the
actions of private parties. Consequently, the possibility of invoking an unim-
plemented directive would then not depend on its horizontal or (inverse) ver-
tical direct effect, but on the question of whether the respective provision would
impose an obligation onto an individual if it is applied. To the extent that the
substantive content of the provision does not impose any obligations onto in-
dividuals, the directive could be invoked and applied even in horizontal dis-
putes.75 What speaks in favour of this approach is that the Court typically does
not use these categories either, focusing instead on whether a provision can be
invoked in this situation and/or against this (specific) party.76 Arguably the same
applies to the case law on the invocability of the fundamental freedoms.77
A rather crude formulation of this interpretive approach to the direct effect of
directives can be linked to early attempts to explain the ‘incidental effects’ case
law by making a distinction between different types of directives.78 Some dir-
ectives only intend to create obligations for the Member States, while others
have as their objective the creation of rights and obligations for private parties.79
74 Ibid.
75 In its various manifestations, this theory has been proposed in the context of the debate on the
horizontal direct effect of directives. It is unclear to what extent its proponents would also endorse the
same distinction in the context of inverse vertical situations. To this end, see our critique on this
theory in section IV.B below.
76 See eg Faccini Dori (n 39), para 20; CIA Security (n 50), para 55. While seeking further support for
this hypothesis, we found that a Curia search—which admittedly is a rather crude and all but fool-
proof method—for ‘horizontal direct effect’ in grounds of judgment results in only one result,
Rodrı´guez Sa´nchez C-351/14, EU:C:2016:447, para. 69.
77 See eg Laval un Partneri Ltd C-341/05, EU:C:2007:809; Viking Line C-438/05, EU:C:2007:772;
and Fra.bo SpA C-171/11, EU:C:2012:453, where the Court refrains from using the term ‘horizontal
(direct) effect’ but instead assesses whether Arts 56, 49, and 34 TFEU respectively must be inter-
preted as being capable of being invoked against the specific private organizations in question.
78 Dougan (n 53); H Gilliams, ‘Horizontale werking van richtlijnen: dogma’s en realiteit’ in H Cousy
(ed.), Liber Amicorum Walter van Gerven (Kluwer, 2000); MJM Verhoeven and JH Jans, ‘Doorwerking
via conforme interpretatie en rechtstreekse werking’ in S Prechal and RJGM Widdershoven (eds),
Inleiding tot het Europees Bestuursrecht (Ars Aequi, 2017); JH Jans and MJM Verhoeven,
‘Europeanisation via Consistent Interpretation and Direct Effect’ in JH Jans, S Prechal, and RJGM
Widdershoven (eds), Europeanisation of Public Law (2nd edn, Europa Law Publishing, 2015).
79 Gilliams (n 78), 241ff; Verhoeven and Jans, ‘Doorwerking’ (n 78), 98–9; Jans and Verhoeven,
‘Europeanisation’ (n 78), 117.
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Put slightly differently, one can distinguish between directives which regulate
only relations between Member States and individuals, in the sense of imposing
obligations onto Member States which can be enforced by individuals, and
directives which regulate purely individual relations as well, for example in
the area of consumer protection and discrimination.80 Directive 83/189/EEC
is a typical example of the first category. Conversely, Faccini Dori and El Corte
Ingle´s deal with directives which are aimed at regulating private relationships—
doorstep selling81 and consumer credit agreements,82 respectively. This distinc-
tion seems to underlie the approach by Advocate General Elmer in CIA
Security83 as well as the Opinion of Advocate General Jacobs in Unilever,84
and may thus be one of the foundations of the ‘incidental effects’ case law.
Moreover, the Court’s judgment in Unilever appears to support this interpret-
ation insofar as it emphasizes that Directive 83/189/EEC can be invoked in a
private dispute because it contains neither rights nor obligations for individ-
uals.85 Thus, Dougan presents this interpretation of the case law as an alterna-
tive formulation of the ‘disguised vertical direct effect theory’, since invoking
such a directive would effectively amount to invoking it against the Member
State notwithstanding the horizontal nature of the dispute.86
It is not necessary for this theory, however, to distinguish only between dif-
ferent ‘types’ of (entire) directives. In its most refined form, the interpretive
approach would boil down to reducing the prohibition of horizontal direct
effect to a prohibition of giving effect to an unimplemented directive which
includes in its scope actions by private parties.87 By contrast, unimplemented
directives which do not cover actions by private parties in their scope could be
invoked in horizontal situations without any difficulties, because by definition
they do not impose obligations onto individuals. At its core, this theory could be
understood as arguing that there is no prohibition of a direct effect of directives,
in whatever type of dispute, because all limits to the invocability of justiciable
directives could be conceived as interpretive questions about the directive’s
scope.88
In practice, therefore, the question of whether a directive may be invoked
against another individual can be answered by looking at the ratione personae
80 Dougan (n 53), 601–5.
81 Council Directive 85/577/EEC of 20 December 1985 to protect the consumer in respect of
contracts negotiated away from business premises [1985] OJ L372/31.
82 Council Directive 87/102/EEC of 22 December 1986 for the approximation of the laws, regu-
lations, and administrative provisions of the Member States concerning consumer credit [1987] OJ
L42/48.
83 Opinion of AG Elmer in CIA Security C-194/94, EU:C:1995:346, para. 71.
84 Opinion of AG Jacobs in Unilever C-443/98, EU:C:2000:57, paras 75–81.
85 Unilever (n 50), para. 51.
86 Dougan (n 53), 601–5.
87 This appears to be Schu¨tze’s position in Schu¨tze (n 1), 283; and R Schu¨tze, European Union Law
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and ratione materiae of the respective provision. Insofar as the specific provision
does not include actions by private parties (ratione materiae), and is not directly
aimed at private parties (ratione personae), it can be invoked even in a horizontal
dispute. Notwithstanding the horizontal nature of the dispute, the effect of the
directive is in reality to obligate the national court to set aside conflicting na-
tional law. Insofar as the scope of the provision of the directive does not include
actions by individuals, this provision cannot be said to impose any obligations
onto another individual, so that the prohibition of horizontal direct effect is not
applicable.
C. Distinguishing between direct effect and primacy: the substitution–
exclusion dichotomy
The distinction between invocabilite´ de substitution and invocabilite´ d’exclusion
(hereinafter also referred to as the ‘substitution–exclusion dichotomy) originated
in the French literature on European administrative law,89 in particular the work
of Denys Simon,90 and has been actively endorsed by several Advocates General
and members of the Court.91 In its original formulation, invocabilite´ d’exclusion
and invocabilite´ de substitution are two out of five distinct forms of invocability
with increasing intensity of justiciability: l’invocabilite´ d’interpre´tation conforme
(consistent interpretation); l’invocabilite´ d’exclusion; l’invocabilite´ de prevention
(the Inter-Environnement Wallonie obligation for Member States to refrain from
jeopardizing the future effectiveness of directives even before the end of the
transposition deadline); l’invocabilite´ de re´paration (state liability); and l’effet
de substitution.92
Other commentators have mainly focused on the distinction between invoc-
abilite´ d’exclusion and invocabilite´ de substitution in order to explain the case law
on the direct effect of directives.93 Whilst there appear to be some nuances
89 See generally, Y Galmot, J-C Bonichot, and G Isaac, Droit communautaire general (Masson, 1994);
T Dal Farra, ‘L’invocabilite´ des directives communautaires devant le juge national de la le´galite´’
(1992) 28 RTD eur.i, 631; D Simon, La directive europe´enne (Dalloz, 1997); Simon (n 1).
90 Simon (n 1).
91 Opinion of AG Le´ger in Linster C-287/98, EU:C:2000:3; Opinion of AG Ruiz-Jarabo Colomer in
Pfeiffer C-397/01 to C-403/01, EU:C:2003:245; and Opinion of AG Kokott in Berlusconi C-387/
02, C-391/02, and C-403/02, EU:C:2004:624 and members of the Court, Lenaerts and Corthaut (n
34).
92 Simon (n 1), 437–50.
93 See eg Lenz et al. (n 53); Lenaerts and Corthaut (n 8); Lenaerts and Corthaut (n 30). See earlier, C
Timmermans, ‘Directives: Their Effects within the National Legal Systems’ (1979) 16 CML Rev,
533; Y Galmot and JC Bonichot, ‘La Cour de justice europe´enne et la transposition des directives en
droit national’ (1988) 4 Revue franc¸aise de Droit administrative, 1; P Manin, ‘L’invocabilite´ des
directives: quelques interrogations’ (1990) 26 Revue trimestrielle de droit europe´en, 669; Bach (n
35); K Lenaerts, ‘L’e´galite´ de traitement en droit communautaire’ (1991) 27 Cahiers de droit
europe´en, 3; PJ Slot, ‘Annotation of CIA Security International SA’ (1996) 33 CML Rev, 1035; C
Timmermans, ‘Community Directives Revisited’ (1998) 17 Yearbook of European Law, 1; A Barav,
‘Rapport Ge´ne´ral’ in XVIII Congre`s FIDE, Stockholm, 3–6 June 1998, Les directives communau-
taires: effets, efficacite´, justiciabilite´’, 418.






/yel/article-abstract/doi/10.1093/yel/yez004/5543611 by guest on 06 April 2020
among the various available approaches, in essence the substitution–exclusion
dichotomy boils down to distinction between direct effect and an independent
application of the primacy of EU law.94 According to the substitution–exclu-
sion dichotomy, also known as the so-called primacy model,95 direct effect
must be confined to the invocability of the EU law norms themselves to be
applied in the dispute at hand, as for example in Van Gend en Loos and
Defrenne.96 In other words, direct effect is necessarily an instance of invoc-
ability of substitution, as the EU provision that is invoked substitutes the
conflicting national provision.
By contrast, the incidental effects cases and triangular conflicts, such as Wells,
are merely examples of primacy: a conflict between national and EU law must
be solved by disapplying national law in accordance with the basic conflict rule of
the primacy of EU law. So conceived, the substitution–exclusion dichotomy is
based on the premise that the primacy rule is in itself capable of generating
exclusionary effects, with direct effect playing no role,97 which fits the obligation
of national courts98 and administrative authorities99 to disapply all national law
in conflict with EU law.100 As Dougan observed, the substitution–exclusion
dichotomy assumes a unitary European legal order, in the sense that the primacy
of EU law independently can generate exclusionary effects in the national legal
orders without the need for direct effect.101 Secondly, it assumes that invoc-
ability of exclusion does not require an EU provision to be sufficiently precise
and unconditional, or at least that this threshold does not apply as forcefully as
it does to invocability of substitution.102
In the context of the invocability of directives, the most notable assertion of
the substitution–exclusion dichotomy is that the prohibitions of the horizontal
and inverse vertical direct effect of directives only apply to invocability of sub-
stitution. We will scrutinize this claim in Section IV below, concluding that at
any rate it lacks explanatory power towards the case law.
94 See Dougan (n 4); Lenaerts and Corthaut (n 30).
95 Using the terminology of Dougan (n 4).
96 See particularly Lenaerts and Corthaut (n 30).
97 Dougan (n 4), 933.
98 Simmenthal, 106/77, EU:C:1978:49.
99 Fratelli Costanzo (n 56).
100 The emphasis on the obligation of national institutions to exclude, ie disapply, any national
provision conflicting with an EU provision that is invoked by an individual, seems to suggest that the
substitution–exclusion distinction is broadly similar to the distinction between subjective and ob-
jective direct effect. However, this equation would be mistaken since some instances of ‘objective
direct effect’ require substitution of the directive provision. We show this was the case in, eg,
Salzburger Flughafen in Section IV below.
101 Dougan (n 4), 943–4.
102 Dougan (n 4), 941–2, criticizing this assumption by pointing out that insofar as sufficient
precision and unconditionality are necessary conditions of justiciability, they necessarily apply to
any instance of invocation, because if these conditions are not met, by definition it follows that the
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D. An impossible task?
It has become almost a commonplace that none of the suggested theories of
direct effect of directives succeeds in providing a watertight explanation of the
case law.103 It seems hardly convincing, therefore, to maintain the proposition
that the doctrine of direct effect is merely a matter of justiciability in the context
of directives, because clearly the criteria of sufficient clarity and unconditionality
do not exhaust the question of direct effect.
Moreover, to the extent that direct effect should be better conceived as a
matter of the degree of and limits to invocability, no general theory has been
able to explain the seemingly arbitrary exceptions to the prohibitions of hori-
zontal and inverse vertical direct effect.104 Doctrine has given up, it seems:
it hardly seems so painful, being forced to acknowledge that the search for a theor-
etically respectable, watertight descriptive account of the fractured, fumbling case law
on the direct effect of Directives is a task fit only for masochists.105
Nonetheless, we claim to be able to provide a theory of the case law that does
have descriptive accuracy and, further, is normatively desirable over its main
competitors. In order to introduce this theory—which we refer to as the ‘nor-
mative impact theory’—in Section III we will first revisit the case law on the
direct effect of directives and highlight that the distinction between ‘direct ob-
ligations’ and ‘mere adverse repercussions’ is the key distinction in both the case
law on the prohibition of horizontal direct effect as well as that on inverse
vertical direct effect and triangular situations. Then, in Section IV, we will
return to the abovementioned theories to show why they fail to describe the
case law: they are unable to accurately reflect the direct obligations–mere adverse
repercussions distinction. In Section V, we introduce the normative impact
theory, and link it to the case law.
III. Mere adverse repercussions and the prohibitions of horizontal
and inverse vertical direct effect
From the perspective of the estoppel argument,106 the prohibition of inverse
vertical direct effect can be viewed as a subject-based limit to direct effect, as the
estoppel rule justifies why a certain actor may not invoke a directive’s norms.107
Alternatively, when we focus on the effects of invoking a provision of an EU
103 See Dougan (n 4), 963; Prinssen (n 1).
104 See n 5 above.
105 Dougan (n 4), 963.
106 P Pescatore, ‘L’effet des directives communautaires’(n 1), 171; Schu¨tze (n 87), 97–8.
107 Cf vertical and ‘intermediate horizontal’ situations (the latter term is used by Albors-Llorens (n
42) to describe a dispute between two public authorities), where the estoppel rule gives a justification
as to why a certain actor may not resist the invocation of norms of a directive by another actor.
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directive, the same prohibition can also be justified by reference to the hypo-
thetical consequences of inverse vertical and horizontal direct effect, namely that
an individual would be confronted with legal obligations from an instrument
which is only binding on the Member States. Various legal principles, including
legality and legal certainty, resist such an outcome. Both subject-based and
effects-based arguments can be found in the Court’s case law.108 Yet, all judg-
ments emphasize the fact that directives may not impose obligations onto in-
dividuals, thus stressing the consequences of allowing a directive to be invoked to
the detriment of an individual. This is most clearly visible in the case law on the
prohibition of inverse vertical direct effect of directives.
The first case in which the Court clarified the existence of a prohibition of
inverse vertical direct effect concerns the criminal proceedings in Pretore di
Salo`.109 An Italian criminal court brought a prosecution against unknown per-
sons for the pollution of the waters of the river Chiese in Italy. The Italian court
leading the preliminary investigations wanted to base its proceedings on Articles
635, 625(7), and 632 of the Italian Criminal Code on the aggravated pollution
of waters, diversion of water and interference with the state of premises respect-
ively.110 However, this action required considering the river Chiese as being a
habitat for fish, something which would have been possible only by relying on
Directive 78/659/EEC on the quality of fresh waters itself.111 Italian authorities
had allegedly failed to designate the river Chiese as salmonid waters in need of
protection under Article 4(1) of the Directive and thus did not adopt a pro-
gramme of measures to protect the river, as would have been required by Article
5 of the Directive. The national court did not enquire whether the Directive
may of itself and independently of the internal law of a Member State could
have the effect of determining or aggravating the liability in criminal law of
persons acting in contravention of the provisions of that Directive. Yet, the ECJ
decided to interpret the preliminary question to include this issue, to which it
replied by stating that Council Directive 78/659/EEC cannot, of itself and
independently of the implementing legislation adopted by a Member State,
have the effect of determining or aggravating the liability in criminal law of
persons who act in contravention of the provisions of that Directive, without
reference to the estoppel argument.112
108 Sometimes concurrently, see eg Kolpinghuis (n 42), para. 8 (subject-based arguments) and para. 9
(effects-based arguments).
109 Pretore di Salo` (n 42).
110 Opinion of AG Mancini in Pretore di Salo` 14/86, EU:C:1987:136.
111 Council Directive 78/659/EEC on the quality of fresh waters needing protection or improvement
in order to support fish life [1978] OJ L 222/1.
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This conclusion was reiterated in subsequent case law on criminal proceed-
ings,113 with Kolpinghuis becoming the landmark case on the prohibition of
inverse vertical direct effect.114 The principles of legality and legal certainty, with
their corollaries—most notably, the principle that a provision of the criminal
law may not be applied extensively to the detriment of the defendant, and the
principle of non-retroactivity of a criminal rule—preclude criminal proceedings
in respect of conduct not clearly defined as creating criminal liability by law.115
The only exception here is a situation in which criminal liabilities are based on
more stringent protective measures, ie gold-plating and green-plating, as this is
essentially national law subject to EU general principles and fundamental rights
only when restricting the achievement of EU goals.116 Such a situation occurred
in Fornasar,117 where an Italian court asked several questions about the legal
status of diphenylmethanedi-isocyanate (MDI) under Council Directive 91/
689/EEC on hazardous waste.118 While this substance is not indicated as haz-
ardous under the then applicable Community rules, MDI is extremely danger-
ous to human health according to experts, and it could be included in one of the
annexes to the Directive due to its similarities with the substances indicated
therein.119 Mr Fornasar and the other private persons facing criminal proceed-
ings explicitly relied on the prohibition of inverse vertical direct effect to argue
that the case was not admissible.120 The Court dismissed this plea, as it was for
the national court to decide whether to ask preliminary questions and there was
no evidence that the answer to the questions did not bear on a real situation or
on the subject matter of the case in the main proceedings.121 The Court then
concluded that the Directive does not prevent the Member States, including
their courts for matters within their jurisdiction, from classifying as hazardous
113 Arcaro (n 42); and Berlusconi (n 42).
114 Kolpinghuis (n 42).
115 Criminal proceedings against X C-74/95 and C-129/95, EU:C:1996:491, para. 25; Criminal
proceedings against X C-60/02, EU:C:2004:10, para. 61.
116 See L Squintani, Beyond Minimum Harmonisation: Green-plating and Gold-plating of European
Environmental Law (Cambridge University Press, 2019), ch. 1 with further references; see also HT
Anker et al., ‘Coping with EU Environmental Legislation: Transposition, Principles and Practices’
(2015) 27 Journal of Environmental Law, 17; L Squintani, Gold-Plating of European Environmental
Law, PhD Thesis, University of Groningen (2013); and JH Jans and L Squintani with A Aragao, R
Macrory, and BW Wegener, ‘“Gold Plating” of European Environmental Measures?’ (2009) 6
Journal of European Environmental and Planning Law, 417, 418; L Squintani, JM Holwerda, and
KJ de Graaf, ‘Regulating Greenhouse Gas Emissions from EU ETS Installations: What Room Is Left
for the Member States’ in M Peeters and M Stallworthy (eds), Climate Law in EU Member States:
Towards National Legislation for Climate Protection (Edward Elgar, 2012).
117 Fornasar and Others C-318/98, EU:C:2000:337.
118 Council Directive 91/689/EEC on hazardous waste [1991] OJ L377/20) and Council Decision
94/904/EC establishing a list of hazardous waste pursuant to Article 1(4) of Directive 91/689 [1994]
OJ L356/14.
119 Fornasar (n 117), paras 16 and 22.
120 Ibid para. 25.
121 Ibid paras 27–28.
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waste anything not featuring on the list of hazardous waste laid down by
Community law, and thus from adopting more stringent protective measures
in order to prohibit the abandonment, dumping or uncontrolled disposal of
such waste.122
Despite the relevance of this effects-based argument in the field of criminal
law, it would be mistaken to consider it relevant only in the context of criminal
proceedings.123 The prohibition of inverse vertical direct effect also applies in
the context of administrative law proceedings. In Portga´s,124 the manager of the
Operational Programme North, which is part of the Portuguese Ministry of
Agriculture, the Sea, the Environment and Town and Country Planning, wanted
to rely on Article 4(1) of Council Directive 93/38/EEC125 to recover the finan-
cial assistance which had been granted to Portga´s. The ECJ replied that direct-
ives cannot impose obligation upon individuals and that if Portga´s were to be
qualified as a private person, the Portuguese state would be precluded from
relying on the Directive against Portga´s,126 something which was for the na-
tional court to ascertain.
Finally, the prohibition of inverse vertical direct effect is also relevant in
private law proceedings. In Accardo,127 the ECJ considered whether the Turin
Municipality could rely on Council Directive 93/104/EC128 on working time,
against Mr Accardo and other municipal police officers. Mr Accardo and his
colleagues had claimed compensation for harm allegedly suffered in the period
1998–2007 as a result of the Municipality’s failure to comply with requirements
on weekly rest periods. The ECJ explicitly denied the Municipality the possi-
bility of relying on the Directive against Mr Accardo and his colleagues.129
Three red lines emerge from the analysis above. First, the estoppel argument
has sometimes been used by the ECJ as an autonomous argument to justify the
prohibition of inverse vertical direct effect. In addition, however, the ECJ has
indicated that the principles of legality, legal certainty, and more implicitly,
proportionality130 stand in the way of applying directives directly against indi-
viduals,131 overall stressing the importance of considering the consequences of
122 Ibid para. 51.
123 cf Lenaerts and Corthaut (n 30), 303; see further section IV.C below.
124 Portga´s (n 6).
125 Council Directive 93/38/EEC coordinating the procurement procedures of entities operating in
the water, energy, transport and telecommunications sectors [1993] OJ L199/84.
126 Portga´s (n 6) para 25.
127 Accardo and Others C-227/09, EU:C:2010:624.
128 Council Directive 93/104/EC concerning certain aspects of the organization of working time
[1993] OJ L307/18. This provision establishes an exception to certain provisions of the directive.
129 Accardo (n 127), paras 46–47.
130 The principle of proportionality is relevant in that Art. 5(4) TEU obligates the EU to use the least
onerous legal instrument. It is widely accepted that a directive allows the Member States more room
for discretion than a regulation does, with only the latter having direct applicability vis-a`-vis indi-
viduals. See also Faccini Dori C-91/92, EU:C:1994:292, paras 22–24.
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direct effect. Indeed, in some cases the prohibition of inverse vertical direct
effect was only justified by reference to effects-based arguments.132 In this
regard, the Court stressed, third, that the prohibition of inverse vertical direct
effect is triggered by the invocation of a norm which creates obligations.
Invoking a norm which only results in factual repercussions—as opposed to
obligations—does not trigger the prohibition of inverse vertical direct effect.
This contrast is shown most explicitly by the Wells case.133
In this case the Court allowed Mrs Wells to rely directly on a provision of the
EIA [Environmental Impact Assessment] Directive134 in challenging a decision
of a public authority granting development consent to an undertaking for the
exploitation of a quarry adjacent to Mrs Wells’s house. According to the Court,
the annulment of the consent is a ‘mere adverse repercussion on the rights of [the
quarry owner]’. Even if such repercussions are certain, they ‘do not justify pre-
venting an individual from relying on the provisions of a directive against the
Member State concerned’.135 In this regard, the ECJ emphasized that triangular
situations are only possible when the vertical direct effect of the Directive leads
to mere adverse repercussions—and not a legal obligation—for a third private
party.136 This showed that the ECJ explicitly aimed to maintain the prohibition
of inverse vertical direct effect highlighted in Kolpinghuis.137 While triangular
situations are common mainly in environmental law cases, the doctrine extends
equally to other areas of administrative law, as can be seen for example in Fratelli
Costanzo (public procurement),138 and Arcor (telecom regulation).139
The obligations versus mere adverse repercussions dichotomy was maintained
in Salzburger Flughafen, regardless of the fact that, as opposed to Wells, in this
case it was a public authority that relied on the EIA Directive against another
public authority. The facts of this case were roughly as follows. In 2004
Salzburger Flughafen GmbH submitted two requests for development consent
for the expansion of the airport of Salzburg in Austria, to the relevant competent
authority (the Amt der Salzburger Landesregierung). An EIA for these two pro-
jects was not required under national law because the EIA Directive had been
transposed into national law to include a threshold which was not trespassed by
the project ad quo. The Umweltsenat, however, was of the opinion that national
law violated the Directive, and applied the relevant provisions of the Directive
directly by establishing that the development consent was conditional on an EIA
132 Pretore di Salo (n 42), para. 20. See also, Berlusconi (n 42), paras 73–74.
133 See already implicitly in eg Commission v Germany C-431/92, EU:C:1995:260.
134 Nowadays, Directive 2011/92/EU on the Assessment of the Effects of Certain Public and Private
Projects on the Environment [2012] OJ L26/1.
135 Wells (n 56), para. 57. See also Arcor AG C-152/07 to C-154/07, EU:C:2008:426, para. 36.
136 Wells (n 56) paras 56–57.
137 Ibid paras 56–58.
138 Fratelli Costanzo (n 56), paras 30–31. See also Lackhoff and Nyssens (n 56); and Colgan (n 56)
analysing triangular situations in a variety of disputes outside environmental law.
139 Arcor (n 135), paras 35–38.
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being produced. This decision subsequently led to legal proceedings before the
Austrian Supreme Administrative Court (Verwaltungsgerichtshof ), which referred
a number of preliminary questions to the ECJ as to the proper interpretation of
the Directive. As regards the question of whether the Directive could be applied
directly, the ECJ concluded that Salzburger Flughafen, as the user of the land in
question, must also bear the consequences of such a decision.140
This conclusion shows that the Court’s focus on the obligations versus mere
adverse repercussions dichotomy is agnostic to the question of who is invoking
the directive, further decreasing the relevance of the estoppel rationale. The
same is true for the case law on the prohibition of horizontal direct effect. In
this context, while the Court does not use the terminology of direct obligations
and mere adverse repercussions, the main argument used by the Court to limit
the invocability of directives in horizontal situations is intrinsically linked to the
obligations—mere adverse repercussions dichotomy, as a closer look at the case
law reveals.
In judgments affirming the prohibition of horizontal direct effect, the Court
invariably emphasized that directives cannot be invoked against individuals be-
cause they cannot of itself impose obligations on an individual.141 Accordingly,
unlike in the case law on inverse vertical direct effect, the question of who is
invoking a directive plays no role in the case law on horizontal direct effect,
which is based entirely on the consequences which an individual must suffer—in
line with the obligations versus mere adverse repercussions dichotomy.
The case law on the so-called incidental effects provides further confirmation
of the Court’s focus on this dichotomy in horizontal disputes, with Unilever
Italia as the main exponent. As we noted in Section II above, CIA Security,142
Pafitis,143 and Ruiz Berna´ldez144 had led commentators to question the relevance
of the prohibition of horizontal direct effect.145 When the Court was asked to
clarify the relevance of CIA Security for the prohibition of horizontal direct effect
of directives, it responded by stating that ‘Directive 83/189 does not in any way
define the substantive scope of the legal rule on the basis of which the national
court must decide the case before it. It creates neither rights nor obligations for
individuals’.146
In El Corte Ingle´s the Court reconfirmed the prohibition of horizontal direct
effect in not allowing Ms Bla´zquez Rivero to rely on the unimplemented
Directive 87/102/EEC on consumer credit agreements against the travel
140 Ibid paras 45–47. See also L Squintani and HHB Vedder, ‘Towards Inverse Direct Effect?: A
Silent Development of a Core European Law Doctrine’ (2014) 23 Review of European Community
and International Environmental Law, 144.
141 Marshall (n 37, para. 48; Faccini Dori (n 54), para. 20.
142 CIA Security (n 50).
143 Pafitis and Others C-441/93, EU:C:1996:92.
144 Ruiz Berna´ldez (n 51).
145 See eg n 53 and n 56. We discuss the facts of these cases further in Sections V and VI.
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agency El Corte Ingle´s because that would impose an obligation on the latter.147
Similarly, a few years after the incidental effects cases in its Pfeiffer judgment,
which concerned the Working Time Directive,148 the Court concluded that
reliance of the Directive would impose an obligation upon individuals that
was not permissible.149
A conjunctive look at Unilever and Pfeiffer shows that, once again, the obli-
gations versus mere adverse repercussions dichotomy is used as a cornerstone for
the invocability of direct effect in the context of directives. Implicitly, in CIA
Security and Unilever Italia, the Court considered the negative effects of invok-
ing the Notification Directive for the other individuals as mere adverse reper-
cussions. In Pfeiffer it explicitly observed that invoking the Working Time
Directive would entail direct obligations for another private party.
This distinction is most recently supported and clarified by Smith, in which
the Court revisited its jurisprudence. In this case, Mr Smith became seriously
injured in a car accident while he was sitting in the rear of a van owned by Mr
Meade. This rear part of the van was not designed and constructed with seating
accommodation. Consequently, Meade’s motor insurer FBD refused to provide
him an indemnity on the basis of its insurance policy which did not cover
personal injuries to persons sitting in part of a vehicle not designed and con-
structed with seating accommodation. This policy was in conformity with
Section 65(1)(a)(i) of the Irish Road Traffic Act. According to Article 1 of
Directive 90/232/EEC, however, insurance against civil liability in respect of
the use of motor vehicles ‘shall cover liability for personal injuries to all pas-
sengers, other than the driver, arising out of the use of a vehicle’.150 In response
to the question of whether FBD’s insurance policy ought to be disapplied for
violating Article 1 of the Directive, the Court answered in the negative. It
confirmed that ‘a directive cannot of itself impose obligations on an individual
and cannot therefore be relied upon as such against an individual’,151 and dis-
tinguished CIA Security and Unilever Italia from Faccini Dori and Pfeiffer by
emphasizing that Directive 83/189/EEC
created neither rights nor obligations for individuals, did not determine the substantive
content of the legal rule on the basis of which the national court had to decide the case
before it, meaning that the case-law to the effect that a directive that has not been
147 El Corte Ingle´s (n 52).
148 Council Directive 93/104/EC of 23 November 1993 concerning certain aspects of the organ-
ization of working time [1993] OJ L307/18.
149 Pfeiffer (n 52), paras 104, 108–109.
150 Art. 1 Third Council Directive 90/232/EEC on the approximation of the laws of the Member
States relating to insurance against civil liability in respect of the use of motor vehicles [1990] OJ
L129/33 (emphasis added), referring to Art. 3(1) Council Directive 72/166/EEC on the approxi-
mation of the laws of Member States relating to insurance against civil liability in respect of the use of
motor vehicles, and to the enforcement of the obligation to insure against such liability [1972] OJ
English Special Edition 360.
151 Smith (n 6), para. 42.
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transposed may not be relied on by one individual against another was not relevant in
such a situation.152
It is clear that in Smith, the direct effect of Directive 90/232/EEC would result
in a direct obligation of FBD to indemnify Mr Meade for the damage caused to
Mr Smith. In this regard, it is also clear that this case should be distinguished
from Ruiz Berna´ldez, which involved a somewhat similar question of insurance
coverage, but where the question of direct effect was not raised by the national
court.153
Linking the notion of imposing direct obligations on individuals to the de-
termination of the substantive content of the rule by the national court to the
detriment of a private party, the answer to the question what demarcates ‘direct
obligations’ from ‘mere adverse repercussions’ is related to the question of
whether invoking a directive affects the substantive content of the rule which
determines the dispute at hand. The next section looks at how the doctrine
described in Section II above copes with this task.
IV. Existing theories of the direct effect of directives and the dis-
tinction between direct obligations and mere adverse repercussions
Following the descriptive overview of the main theories that have tried to ex-
plain the Court’s case law on the direct effect of directives in Section II above,
we will now discuss the viability of these theories in the same order in light of
their ability to cope with the distinction between imposing direct obligations
and mere adverse repercussions, highlighted in Section III above. Although
some of these theories have been criticized extensively in earlier literature—
sometimes by their respective authors themselves154—we submit that this ana-
lysis is useful for the purpose of this article. First, we will ground our critique of
all theories in their failure to account for the distinction between direct obliga-
tions and mere adverse repercussions. Secondly, this section will not only serve
as a ‘negative’ analysis of existing theories, but will also pave the way for the
introduction of the normative impact theory of direct effect of directives. An
analysis of existing theories based on the distinction between direct obligations
and mere adverse repercussions will help to understand why the normative
impact theory does succeed in explaining the case law.
In the subsequent analysis, we will pay somewhat more attention to the
descriptive and normative force of the substitution–exclusion dichotomy,
152 Smith (n 6), para. 53 (emphasis added).
153 On the relevance of the functioning of the preliminary reference procedure for the case law on
direct effect, see further Section VI below. On the difference between Smith and Ruiz Berna´ldez see
further Section V.B.i. below.
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because it is arguably the most well-known theory on the direct effect of dir-
ectives, having gained considerable support in the literature, and that of several
Advocates General.155
A. Theories based on different factual situations
As noted in Section II.A, Hilson and Downes’ analysis of the horizontal direct
effect case law in light of Hohfeldian relations focuses on the distinction be-
tween the two correlatives right–obligation and immunity–disability. In this
respect, it seems a suitable candidate for explaining the case law to the extent
that the prohibitions of horizontal and inverse vertical direct effect of directives
are rooted in the notion of directly imposing an obligation onto an individual.
However, as Hilson and Downes readily admit, their approach fails to explain
the Court’s jurisprudence.156 In Pafitis, for example, the old shareholders’ in-
vocation of the directive should in Hohfeldian terms be deemed a ‘right’ to vote
on any capital increase, with the correlative obligation for the bank to annul the
decision. Similarly, Ruiz Berna´ldez involved the invocation of a right from the
respective directive against another individual.157 Faccini Dori, on the other
hand, concerned a situation where Ms Faccini Dori invoked the Doorstep
Selling Directives as an ‘immunity’ rather than a right, entailing a ‘disability’
on the part of the counter-party rather than an ‘obligation’. Hence, contrary to
the Court’s ruling, the Hohfeldian framework would not predict that Faccini
Dori and CIA Security would result in the same outcome.158
In turn, Hilson and Downes suggest that in a horizontal dispute containing a
‘public law element’ individuals have a right to invoke directives either as a
‘shield’ (ie an immunity correlating in a disability, as in CIA Security) or a
‘sword’ (ie a claim-right correlating in an obligation for the other individual,
as in Pafitis and Ruiz Berna´ldez). This conclusion is incompatible with the
Hohfeldian framework, and is not endorsed by the authors.159 The explanatory
weaknesses of this theory have been further confirmed by Pfeiffer, where the
applicable directive was also invoked as an immunity rather than a right, so that
the Hohfeldian framework arguably would predict an allowance of horizontal
direct effect. In conclusion, Hilson and Downes’ theory, although it might have
been a viable option for the Court to pursue, rests on a notion of ‘obligations’
155 Though the distinction between different ‘types’ of directives, as described in Section II.B above,
is partially rooted in the Opinions of AG Elmer (in CIA Security) and AG Jacobs (in Unilever Italia),
neither of these Opinions unequivocally aimed at creating or endorsing a doctrinal theory. By
contrast, the substitution–exclusion theory has been clearly supported by AG Le´ger in Linster (n
91); AG Ruiz-Jarabo Colomer in Pfeiffer (n 91); and AG Kokott in Berlusconi (n 91). See also
Lenaerts and Corthaut (n 30).
156 Hilson and Downes (n 53), 126.
157 Ibid 125–6.
158 Ibid 125.
159 Hilson and Downes (n 53), 127.
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that is clearly not supported by the Court.160 It might be added more generally
that the Hohfeldian framework would clearly fail as an explanatory theory of
direct effect since, as we observed above and Hilson and Downes also recog-
nized, direct effect is not restricted to the invocation of rights.161 We can thus
disband this theory, both as a theory of direct effect in general and, specifically,
as an explanatory mechanism for the Court’s distinction between ‘direct obli-
gations’ and ‘mere adverse repercussions’.
As a second theory distinguishing between different types of factual situations
in which direct effect is relied on, Dougan’s so-called ‘disguised vertical direct
effect’ theory conceives the incidental effects case law as cases involving vertical
direct effect.162 Dougan’s theory can be restated as follows: a provision from an
unimplemented directive can be invoked against an individual insofar as that
individual has not ‘actively breached’ the provision but is merely trying to
benefit opportunistically from the state’s failure to implement the directive.
In light of the distinction between direct obligations and mere adverse reper-
cussions, such a situation of ‘disguised vertical direct effect’ should not be
conceived as imposing an obligation onto the other individual, for she or he
has not breached any provision from the directive.
Thus rephrased, it becomes clear that in any case Berlusconi seems to remain
an anomaly in the case law. In that case, after all, Mr Berlusconi should be
qualified as merely an opportunistic ‘passer-by’ who tried to benefit from new
Italian legislation which breached Italy’s obligations under the directive. This
conclusion cannot be altered by the fact that Berlusconi de facto played a pol-
itical role in introducing it.
Although his theory seems to fit most of the case law apart from Berlusconi,
Dougan already noted himself that the perverse consequence of this approach is
that an individual who has actively infringed a directive is protected by the
prohibition of horizontal direct effect, while an individual who has not actively
breached the directive will be exposed to the directive’s ‘disguised vertical’ direct
effect despite being less culpable.163 Moreover, the theory is premised on the
assumption that some directives, from a material viewpoint, can be breached by
individuals, the denial of which is the very basis of the prohibitions of inverse
vertical and horizontal direct effect. Accordingly, Dougan’s explanation is deeply
at odds with the theoretical assumptions of the Marshall and Kolpinghuis case
law.
160 From a Hohfeldian perspective, this might be a loss for the Court, not theory. One of Hohfeld’s
objectives indeed to expose ‘rights-talk’ by legal participants is often conceptually confused, as the
manner in which legal participants usually talk about rights ‘are a peril both to clear thought and to
lucid expression’. WN Hohfeld, Fundamental Legal Conceptions (Yale University Press, 1964), 35.
161 Hilson and Downes (n 53), 132–8. See also M Szpunar, Direct Effect of Community Directives in
National Courts—Some Remarks Concerning Recent Developments (Centrum Europejskie Natolin,
2003) 19; Lenz et al. (n 53), 516.
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These general criticisms gain further force if the distinction between direct
obligations and mere adverse repercussions is put in the spotlight. The question
of whether invoking an unimplemented directive against an individual amounts
to imposing an obligation onto the latter cannot solely be based on the question
of whether that individual has ‘breached’ the directive. By emphasizing the
effects-based rationale of the prohibitions of horizontal and inverse vertical
direct effect (see Section III above), the case law emphasizes the question of
whether invoking a directive results in imposing a direct obligation on an indi-
vidual, remaining indifferent to the question of whether that obligation is
caused by that individual having breached the directive herself or himself.
B. Theories based on different types of directives and the scope of their
provisions
Theories purporting to draw a distinction between directives which only aim at
creating obligations for Member States, and directives which aim at directly
regulating private relationships, thus creating rights and obligations for individ-
uals, focus on the question of whether an invoked provision can be said to
impose a direct obligation onto an individual. In this respect, it also seems
suitable to explain the dichotomy between direct obligations and mere adverse
repercussions.
Yet, as Prinssen points out, if we focus on the ‘type’ of directive and/or its
‘objective’, Pafitis already entails complications in this respect, as the relevant
Directive concerns the alteration of company capital, and thus clearly intends to
regulate the rights and obligations of shareholders and executives.164
Nonetheless, the Court accepted direct effect contrary to the theory’s prediction.
We might add that Ruiz Berna´ldez fails to fit into this approach as well, as the
applicable Directives relate to insurance in respect of civil liabilities and, hence,
regulate private relationships.165
More generally, there are provisions of directives that are exclusively aimed at
creating obligations for Member States’ but which are nevertheless clearly cap-
able of resulting in the imposition of direct obligations upon individuals if they
were to be invoked before a national court. This is for example the case for the
vast majority of directives adopted in the field of environmental law. They
typically create obligations for the Member States or their national authorities
164 Prinssen (n 1), 162–3.
165 Council Directive 72/166/EEC of 24 April 1972 on the approximation of the laws of Member
States relating to insurance against civil liability in respect of the use of motor vehicles, and to the
enforcement of the obligation to insure against such liability [1972] OJ L103/1; Second Council
Directive 84/5/EEC of 30 December 1983 on the approximation of the laws of the Member States
relating to insurance against civil liability in respect of the use of motor vehicles [1984] OJ L8/17;
Third Council Directive 90/232/EEC of 14 May 1990 on the approximation of the laws of the
Member States relating to insurance against civil liability in respect of the use of motor vehicles
[1990] OJ L129/33.
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only, as exemplified by, for instance, Article 4(1) of the Industrial Emissions (IE)
Directive166 and Article 2(1) of the EIA Directive.167 No direct obligations for
individuals are created. Still, if invoked by such authorities against an individual
in the absence of implementing measures, for example to subject an undertaking
to the permit requirements based on the IE Directive, this would unequivocally
be a situation of inverse vertical direct effect.168
The growing tendency of relying on wrongly implemented EU environmental
law provisions in torts based cases, as occurred in the Urgenda case,169 even in
horizontal situations,170 suggests that the same conclusion could be reached in
cases started by private parties. In turn, the prohibitions of inverse vertical direct
effect and horizontal direct effect of directives would be superfluous in the
context of EU environmental law, a conclusion which has no support in the
case law.
Moreover, this theory assumes that there is a distinction between directives
which, in substance, do create obligations for individuals, and directives which
do not, and that this characteristic has repercussions for the question of whether
a certain directive can have direct effect. However, the denial of directives being
able to impose direct obligations onto individuals lies precisely at the core of the
case law which doctrine ought to explain. In sum, this theory fails to explain
how distinguishing between different types of directives can make sense of the
166 Directive 2010/75/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 November 2010 on
industrial emissions [2010] OJ L334/17, stating: ‘Member States shall take the necessary measures to
ensure that no installation or combustion plant, waste incineration plant or waste co-incineration
plant is operated without a permit’.
167 Directive 2011/92/EU (n 134), stating, ‘Member States shall adopt all measures necessary to
ensure that, before development consent is given, projects likely to have significant effects on the
environment by virtue, inter alia, of their nature, size or location are made subject to a requirement
for development consent and an assessment with regard to their effects on the environment . . .’
168 Cf. MJM Verhoeven and JH Jans, ‘Doorwerking via conforme interpretatie en rechtstreekse
werking’ in S Prechal and RJGM Widdershoven (eds), Inleiding tot het Europees Bestuursrecht (Ars
Aequi, 2017), 98–9.
169 Stichting Urgenda v Netherlands, The Hague District Court, NL:RBDHA:2015:7145 (24 June
2015) upheld on appeal in Netherlands v Stichting Urgenda, The Hague Appeals Court,
NL:GHDHA:2018:2591 (9 October 2018). See also in the UK, Plan B and Others v Secretary of
State for Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy, [2018] EWHC 1892 (Admin). On the use of tort law
to enforce EU environmental directives in the field of air quality law and water management, see E
Plambeck and L Squintani, ‘Rechtsbescherming tegen plannen en programma’s in het omgevings-
recht in het licht van het Unierecht’ (2019) 67 Sociaal Economische wetgeving, 2; and L Squintani and
E Plambeck, ‘Judicial Protection against Plans and Programmes Affecting the Environment: A
Backdoor Solution to Get an Answer from Luxembourg’ (2016) 13 Journal for European
Environmental & Planning Law, 294.
170 Lliuya v RWE AG, Landgericht Essen, No 2 O 285/15 (15 December 2016). On these trends: M
Reese, J Jendros´ka, and L Squintani, ‘The Courts as Guardians of the Environment—New
Developments in Access to Justice and Environmental Litigation’, in International Comparative
Legal Guide to Environment & Climate Change Law (Global Legal Group, 2019); L Squintani,
‘Tort-Law based Environmental Litigation: A Victory or a Warning?’ (2018) 15 Journal for
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distinction between imposing direct obligations onto individuals and causing
mere adverse repercussions.
Making a distinction between the direct effect of a provision and the inter-
pretation of its personal and material scope, as Schu¨tze suggests,171 causes the
same explanatory and normative problems. Such an approach may serve to
explain the outcome of the incidental effects case law, where it was emphasized
that the Notification Directive did not contain any obligations for individuals
and, accordingly, could be invoked in horizontal disputes.172 Similarly, cases
focusing on the EIA Directive, such as Wells and Salzburger Flughafen, could be
interpreted as implying that direct effect was allowed because the respective
provisions of the EIA Directive only contain obligations for Member States,
excluding individuals from their personal scope.173
However, in contrast to situations of horizontal direct effect, this approach is
irreconcilable with the case law on inverse vertical situations of an administrative
or criminal nature, since directives in these areas typically contain ample pro-
visions merely directed towards Member State actions. The Berlusconi case serves
as a useful example.174 By definition, the personal scope of the provisions of the
Company Directive that require Member States to provide for appropriate
penalties against money laudering are confined to Member State actions.
Accordingly, these provisions can never directly cover ‘private party actions’.
Yet, in Berlusconi direct effect was denied because the invocability of the unim-
plemented directive clearly caused the imposition of an obligation onto Mr
Berlusconi. If the prohibition of inverse vertical direct effect of directives
would not to apply to provisions excluding private party actions from their
personal and/or material scope, Member States could freely apply any provisions
such as those requiring Member States to take appropriate, proportionate, and
deterrent sanctions from unimplemented directives against individuals.
The same conclusion applies to directives in the field of EU environmental
law, where, as we already noted above, the overwhelming majority of provisions
cover only Member State actions. To say these provisions could be invoked in
horizontal disputes, in vertical disputes in which an individual seeks to force the
Member State to take enforcement action against another individual, or in
inverse vertical cases, would be incompatible with the case law.
A counterargument against this criticism could of course be that the prohib-
ition of inverse vertical direct effect has an independent rationale, ie the estoppel
171 Schu¨tze (n 1), 282–3.
172 Cf Unilever Italia (n 50), para. 51.
173 Wells (n 56), paras 56–58; Salzburger Flughafen (n 7), para. 46.
174 See also Kolpinghuis (n 42), which concerned Art. 2 of Council Directive 80/777/EEC of 15 July
1980 on the approximation of the laws of the Member States relating to the exploitation and
marketing of natural mineral waters [1980] OJ L229/1, stating ‘Member States shall take the meas-
ures necessary to ensure that only the waters referred to in Article 1 which comply with the provisions
of this Directive may be marketed as natural mineral waters’. Private party actions clearly fall outside
the scope of this provision.






/yel/article-abstract/doi/10.1093/yel/yez004/5543611 by guest on 06 April 2020
rule, which prevents a Member State from relying on any directive against an
individual. However, the estoppel rule has been criticized extensively for being
unsuitable as a basis for direct effect in general, as direct effect would be merely a
‘side effect’ or ‘corollary’ of the failure of the Member State concerned.175
Moreover, in the context of the prohibition of inverse vertical direct effect,
the Court has consequently emphasized the effect-based rationale of the pro-
hibition of inverse vertical direct effect.176 In Arcaro, while the Court refers to
the estoppel argument in the context of the prohibition of inverse vertical direct
effect of directives, the prohibition itself is clearly grounded in the imperative of
avoiding the imposition of direct obligations upon individuals:
It follows that a directive may not by itself create obligations for an individual and that a
provision of a directive may not therefore be relied upon as such against such a person. The
Court has stated that this case-law seeks to prevent a Member State from taking
advantage of its own failure to comply with Community law.
In that same line of authority the Court has also ruled that a directive cannot, of itself
and independently of a national law adopted by a Member State for its implementation,
have the effect of determining or aggravating the liability in criminal law of persons who
act in contravention of the provisions of that directive.177
The relevance of the estoppel argument as a foundation of the prohibition of
inverse vertical direct effect is also denied in Salzburger Flughafen, where the
Court allowed an administrative entity to rely on a directive against another
administrative entity of the same state.178 This conclusion confirms that the
estoppel argument itself is no longer relevant for the question of whether an
emanation of the state can rely on an unimplemented directive, leaving only the
question of whether invoking a directive would lead to direct obligations for an
individual.179
In sum, after stating that it is relevant to look at whether a directive aims to
create obligations for the Member States, or for private parties, this approach
fails to provide convincing and useful guidance about how to understand this
differentiation, whether or not this theory is framed as distinguishing ‘types of
directives’ or as looking at the personal and material scope of the specific pro-
vision in question. In both cases, the theory fails to appreciate that the
175 Prechal (n 13), 223–6, with further references.
176 Pretore di Salo (n 42), para. 20; Berlusconi (n 42), paras 73–74.
177 Arcaro (n 42), paras 36–7 (emphasis added and references to earlier case law omitted).
178 Salzburger Flughafen (n 7).
179 Salzburger Flughafen (n 7), paras 46–47: ‘In the case which gave rise to the Wells judgment, the
Court held, firstly, that it had to be recognised that it is possible for an individual to rely on the
provisions of Directive 85/337 and, secondly, that the owners of the land at issue had to bear the
consequences of the belated performance of the obligations of the Member State concerned which
follow from that directive. Thus, in the main proceedings [where the EIA Directive was relied upon
by an administrative authority], in the event that a decision finds that an environmental study is
necessary, Salzburger Flughafen, as the user of the land in question, must also bear the consequences
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prohibitions of horizontal direct effect and inverse vertical direct effect are
effects-based in that they serve to avoid imposing obligations onto individuals
as a consequence of invoking a directive. Invoking a directive which only covers
Member State actions as its personal and material scope is nevertheless liable to
create direct obligations for other individuals, making the theory under-inclusive
with a view to the rationale of the Marshall case law.
C. The substitution–exclusion theory
Also the well-known substitution–exclusion theory fails to cope with the distinc-
tion between direct obligations and mere adverse repercussions. Both general
assumptions of the substitution–exclusion theory—the possibility that primacy
can generate exclusionary effects independently of direct effect—and the inapplic-
ability of the criteria of direct effect to invocability of exclusion180 are already in
themselves deeply contested.181 In this section, we will specifically focus on the
capability of the substitution–exclusion theory to account for the distinction be-
tween direct obligations and mere adverse repercussions in the case law.
This theory’s explanatory attractiveness is mainly rooted in the fact that both
the CIA Security case law and Wells suggested that where a directive norm is
invoked to set aside a conflicting national law norm, individuals must bear the
negative consequences of any remaining national law norm or norms which
become applicable because of the disapplication of the norm in conflict with the
directive.182 Thus, it would appear that in situations of invocability of exclusion,
it is not the directive invoked that imposes an obligation onto an individual.
Any such obligations are imposed by the national law remaining in place after
exclusion.
However, in Berlusconi,183 handed down about a year after Wells, the ECJ
confirmed that it does not matter whether the norm imposed upon the
180 See Section II.C above.
181 The second assumption is problematic in light of the link between the criteria for direct effect and
justiciability, see Section II.C above. As for the first assumption, Dougan observed that the primacy
model presupposes a unitary European legal order, in the sense that the primacy of EU law inde-
pendently can generate exclusionary effects in the national legal orders without the need for direct
effect. Criticizing the primacy model of the substitution–exclusion dichotomy, he rightly argued
instead that applying primacy necessarily implies direct effect (Dougan (n 4), 942–3) In other words,
while the proponents of the substitution–exclusion dichotomy posit a narrow conception of direct
effect involving only the application of a sufficiently precise and unconditional norm of EU law to
solve a dispute before a national court, this cannot negate the fact that EU law norms must first
penetrate the national legal orders before they can have any effect at all. This is a fundamental aspect
of direct effect originally conceived by the Court as a corollary to the autonomy of the EU legal order
(to this extent, see Van Gend en Loos, 26/62, EU:C:1963:1). We can of course change labels, but this
does not resolve the underlying conceptual problem that primacy presupposes direct effect more
broadly defined.
182 Ibid. One could infer this from the phrase ‘another obligation falling, pursuant to that directive, on
a third party’ (emphasis added).
183 Berlusconi (n 42).
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individual as a result of inverse vertical direct effect is a national rather than an
EU norm. In both cases, such an imposition would be contrary to the prohib-
ition of inverse vertical direct effect. By contrast, as Advocate General Kokott
argued in her Opinion to this case,184 according to the substitution–exclusion
theory the Directive could be invoked because it would only have an exclusion-
ary effect.185
Although the Court’s explicit reliance on the prohibition of inverse vertical
direct effect in Berlusconi strongly suggests that it rejects the substitution–exclu-
sion dichotomy relied upon by Advocate General Kokott, Lenaerts and
Corthaut emphasize the fact that the obligation for Mr Berlusconi was of a
criminal nature in order to support the substitution–exclusion distinction out-
side criminal law situations:
The problem is not that Community law does not know a technique to set aside
contrary provisions, even between individuals, as will appear below, but that in the
context of a criminal proceeding the effect of the principle of primacy needs to yield
to the legality principle of Art.7 ECHR.186
However, primacy is interpreted in light of the principles of legality and legal
certainty outside criminal law as well. As Article 4(2) TEU shows, the EU shall
respect national identities, including respect for the fundamental constitutional
structures of the Member States.187 The case law of the ECJ in private law cases,
such as in Pfeiffer, and administrative law cases, such as in Portga´s, shows that the
application of primacy is equally influenced by the principles of legality and
legal certainty in private and administrative proceedings. In Pfeiffer, for example,
contrary to Advocate General Ruiz-Jarabo Colomer’s endorsement of the sub-
stitution–exclusion distinction,188 the Court quickly moved on to consistent
interpretation after having established that directives cannot apply in proceed-
ings between private parties even if they meet the conditions for direct effect.189
184 AG Kokott in Berlusconi (n 91), para. 150.
185 It should be noted that seven months before Berlusconi, the Court had followed Advocate General
Kokott in Criminal proceedings against Antonio Niselli C-457/02, EU:C:2004:707, in which the
exclusionary effects of invocability were very similar to those in Berlusconi, leading to a conclusion
which strongly suggested an endorsement of the substitution–exclusion dichotomy. However, in
contrast to the Niselli judgment, which was rendered by the Second Chamber, Berlusconi was a Grand
Chamber case. Hence, it can be safely stated that insofar as Niselli is an anomaly in the case law that
has been clearly overruled by Berlusconi. See Dougan (n 4), 954–5.
186 Lenaerts and Corthaut (n 30), 303.
187 Contrary to the view of Lenaerts and Corthaut (n 30), 303, it would be less accurate to say that
primacy ‘yields’ to the principle of legality or other legal principles. Rather, the primacy (or suprem-
acy) of EU law is shaped by these and other general principles as well as Art. 4(2) TEU through a
process of adopting principles from other legal systems into the EU legal system. See further J
Lindeboom, ‘Why EU Law Claims Supremacy’ (2018) 38 Oxford Journal of Legal Studies, 328,
346–9, relying on Raz’s theory of law as an open system capable of adopting norms from other social
and moral systems by giving such norms binding effect (J Raz, Practical Reason and Norms (Oxford
University Press, 1975), 151–4).
188 AG Ruiz-Jarabo Colomer in Pfeiffer (n 91), paras 37–43.
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Explicit suggestions by Advocates General to draw a distinction between exclu-
sion and substitution met the same fate in two other cases.190 These cases show
that the substitution–exclusion dichotomy focuses too much on the origin of the
obligation, and too little on whether invoking a directive affects the substantive
content of the rule which determines the dispute at hand. We can therefore
conclude that the substitution–exclusion dichotomy is not viable as a descriptive
theory for the case law on direct effect.
The lack of descriptive accuracy does not necessarily mean that the theory is
not normatively desirable. By normative desirability, we refer to the ability of a
theory to produce outcomes which make sense in light of the distinction be-
tween direct obligations and mere adverse repercussions. Accordingly, a theory
ought to respect the balance between ensuring the effectiveness of EU law and
the principles of legality and legal certainty. As to the distinction between direct
obligations and mere adverse repercussions, the substitution–exclusion theory
presupposes that this distinction corresponds to the difference between applying
a norm from an EU directive, and applying a national norm subsequent to an
exclusionary effect.
Hence, the substitution–exclusion dichotomy presents a formalistic interpret-
ation of the prohibition of inverse vertical direct effect, in which the effect of
invocability is not relevant, but solely the normative source of a direct obliga-
tion.191 It is readily admitted that ‘formalism’ runs the risk of being an empty
charge, especially in a discipline that relies so much on form as the legal one.192
What we mean by ‘formalistic’, in this case, is that the substitution–exclusion
theory has an inherent capability to produce false negative or positive outcomes,
in light of the aim of preventing direct obligations for individuals as a result of
invoking a directive.
A false negative outcome would be a situation in which, despite the prohib-
ition of invoking directives against individuals, an individual is confronted with
direct obligations that are a result of invoking a directive due to its purely
exclusionary effect. For example, in Berlusconi, the imposition of a criminal
section on Berlusconi was the direct corollary of invoking the Directive in
order to exclude the application of the national act de-penalizing the conduct.
190 Collino and Chiappero C-343/98, EU:C:2000:441; Oce´ano C-240/98 to C-244/98,
EU:C:2000:346.
191 The substitution–exclusion theory has also been criticized for being too formalistic, albeit on
slightly different grounds than the analysis below, among others by Szpunar (n 161), 19; M Dougan,
‘Annotation of Case C-390/99 Canal Satelite Digital [2002] ECR I-607 and Case C-159/00 Sapod
Audic v EcoEmballages [2002] ECR I-5031’ (2003) 40 CML Rev, 193; and Dougan (n 4), 939–40.
192 See eg G Del Vecchio, The Formal Bases of Law (J Lisle tr, Boston Book Co, 1914); HLA Hart,
‘Positivism and the Separation of Law and Morals’ (1958) 71 Harvard Law Review, 593, 610; EJ
Weinrib, ‘Legal Formalism: On the Immanent Rationality of Law’ (1988) 97 Yale Law Journal, 949;
and RS Summers, ‘How Law Is Formal, and Why It Matters’ (1997) 82 Cornell Law Review, 1165;
HLA Hart, The Concept of Law (3rd edn, Oxford University Press, 2012), ch. 7. On ‘formalism’ as a
frequently empty charge against other theories, see BZ Tamanaha, Beyond the Formalist–Realist
Divide: The Role of Politics in Judging (Princeton University Press, 2009), chs 3, 4, and 9.
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Nevertheless, Advocate General Kokott argued that direct effect should have
been allowed because it only led to exclusionary effects.
A false positive outcome would be a situation in which direct effect is not
allowed because it entails substitution effects, notwithstanding that the conse-
quences of invoking the directive should be qualified as mere adverse repercus-
sions. We can illustrate such an outcome with Salzburger Flughafen. As noted in
Section III above, this case concerned a request to annul a permit granted to an
undertaking operating the airport of Salzburg. Similarly to the Wells case, the
authorization had been granted without performing an EIA. An EIA for this
project was not required under national law because the EIA Directive had been
transposed into national law by stating that certain projects are subjected to an
EIA only when they trespass a given threshold,193 which was not the case for the
project at stake. Accordingly, this infringement of the Directive could not be
remedied by means of national law. In Wells, by contrast, the national obligation
to perform an EIA was potentially capable of covering projects such as that at
stake in that case, at least to the knowledge of the Court.194 Hence, while in
Salzburger Flughafen only substitution could have created an obligation to per-
form an EIA, in Wells an exclusionary effect would have sufficed to remedy the
deficiency of national law in light of the Directive. Consequently, pursuant to
the substitution–exclusion theory, direct effect should not have been allowed in
Salzburger Flughafen, while in Wells it should have. The outcome of both cases
was the same, however, and this seems normatively sound because direct effect
only produced mere adverse repercussions to the opposite private party in both
Wells and Salzburger Flughafen.
The inability of the substitution–exclusion theory to cope with the difference
between direct obligations and mere adverse repercussions also entails that this
theory fails to provide a consistent view on the balance between ensuring the
effectiveness of EU law and the principles of legality and legal certainty. Lenaerts
and Corthaut, for example, argue that direct effect is ‘so powerful that . . . the
Court’s case law, most notably in respect of Directives, . . . put limits as to
whether or when it can be used’.195 In other words, the legal certainty of indi-
viduals must trump effectiveness in cases like Berlusconi and Pfeiffer. This sud-
denly changes in the context of primacy, the application of which requires no
attention for the adverse repercussions for third-party individuals.196 The pri-
macy model purports to explain the incidental effects case law while maintaining
the prohibitions of horizontal and inverse vertical direct effect by simply giving
it a different label.197 This is particularly problematic insofar as the question of
193 Paragraph 3(2) Umweltvertra¨glichkeitspru¨fungsgesetz (UVP-G 2000).
194 118 Wells (n 56), paras 8–19.
195 Lenaerts and Corthaut (n 30), 310.
196 Dougan (n 4), 952. The inconsistency is implicitly acknowledged by ibid 306; and Lenz et al. (n
53), 518.
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whether a case concerns substitution or exclusion might depend on the manner
in which a directive is implemented in national law, making the weighing of
interests fundamentally dependent on how the Member States have used their
discretionary space, and leaving open the possibility of different outcomes in
different Member States.198
D. The need to take into account the impact of invoking a provision of
a directive
Having concluded that all existing theories trying to explain the case law on
direct effect of directives fail to make sense of the case law’s distinction between
direct obligations and mere adverse repercussions, in the next section we suggest
to shift perspectives when analysing the limits to the direct effect of directives by
looking differently at the question of what is meant by imposing an obligation
onto an individual. In this regard, we argue that in determining whether a
directive imposes an obligation onto an individual, it is not important whether
the norm applied by the national court to solve the dispute is one of national
law or of a directive itself. Instead, we focus on the impact of invoking a directive
on the norms governing a conflict before a national court or, as shown by Fratelli
Costanzo,199 a public authority. The distinction between the imposition of an
obligation contrary to the Marshall rule and mere adverse repercussions for third
parties can subsequently be made based on the question of whether invoking a
directive modifies the norms which directly apply to the dispute at hand.
V. The normative impact of invoking directives
In this section, we provide a theoretical framework which focuses on the dis-
tinction between direct obligations and mere adverse repercussions, and which is
capable of explaining all cases involving questions of horizontal or inverse ver-
tical direct effect. This normative impact theory focuses on the impact of invok-
ing an EU directive on the norms directly governing the dispute at hand. We
will first introduce the normative impact theory as a doctrinal model based on
the direct obligations versus mere adverse repercussions dichotomy (Section
V.A). Subsequently, we show how this theory fits the Court’s case law
(Section V.B), by discussing first the incidental effects case law (Section
V.B.i), and then the case law affirming the prohibitions of horizontal and inverse
vertical direct effect (Section V.B.ii).
198 See also M Dougan, ‘Annotation of Case 443/98, Unilever Italia’ (2001) 38 CML Rev, 1503,
1514.
199 Fratelli Costanzo (n 56), para. 33.
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A. The distinction between obligations and mere adverse repercussions
As mentioned above, in triangular situations direct effect is not possible when it
is ‘directly linked to the performance of another obligation falling, pursuant to
that directive, on a third party’. Rather than focusing on the part of this for-
mulation stating ‘pursuant to the directive’, as the substitution–exclusion appears
to do, we suggest focusing mainly on the part stating ‘directly linked to the
performance of another obligation’—ie on the concept of ‘direct obligation’.
In light of the cases in which the prohibition of inverse direct effect was
applied, this formula can be interpreted as meaning that a third party should
not be ordered to do or not do something as a direct consequence of direct effect.
In the cases in which the Court refused to allow direct effect, had direct effect
been allowed the resulting change in the directly applicable norms would have
required the national court to order an individual to perform an obligation: the
criminalization of a particular kind of conduct following criminal prosecu-
tion,200 the repayment of financial assistance,201 or the duty to apply a 48-
hour work week maximum.202 This is evidently unacceptable under EU law, as
it stands.
Yet, in triangular situations such as in Wells, the end of the proceedings does
not lead to the imposition of an obligation upon an individual. This is because
the action in Wells is an action for annulment against a development consent
decision. In this type of action, the success of an individual’s claim such as
that of Mrs Wells leads to the annulment or suspension of the development
consent under dispute.203 Of course, the obligation to annul or suspend the
development consent automatically entails some negative repercussions for
another private party, such as the quarry owner in Wells. These repercussions
are, however, only factual consequences of the change which occurred in the
legal relationship between Mrs Wells and the public authority.204 Indeed, in
Wells we can distinguish between two different factual situations, to each of
which applies a separate set of norms. First, there is the factual situation of the
quarry owner. He wishes to perform an action—the exploitation of a
quarry—and he needs to comply with the norm in UK law which requires
him to request and obtain development consent. Secondly, we have the fac-
tual situation of the public authority. It has to perform an action—the as-
sessment of the request—and it has to respect the norm in UK law setting out
200 See Pretore di Salo` (n 42), Arcaro (n 42), Kolpinghuis (n 42), and Berlusconi (n 42).
201 See Portga´s (n 6).
202 See Accardo (n 127), and Pfeiffer (n 10).
203 Wells (n 56), para. 65.
204 Ibid para. 58: ‘The fact that mining operations must be halted to await the results of the assess-
ment is admittedly the consequence of the belated performance of that State’s obligations. Such a
consequence cannot, however, as the United Kingdom claims, be described as “inverse direct effect” of
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the criteria for the assessment development consent requests. The dispute
between Mrs Wells and the public authority must be located in this latter
situation. Moreover, it is in this latter situation that the Directive is invoked
to change the norm that the public authority must apply to assess the request
for development consent. Therefore, only this latter norm is affected by direct
effect. The first norm—ie the one requiring the quarry owner to obtain de-
velopment consent to exploit the quarry—remains unaffected by the direct
effect of the Directive. The quarry owner must continue to comply with this
rule, just as he had to before Mrs Wells’ successful case. The annulment of
development consent leads to the resetting of the factual circumstances to the
situation which existed prior to the request for development consent.
Abstracting from this case, we can state that direct effect does not create direct
obligations for individuals when it affects a norm different from the one impos-
ing a positive or negative obligation upon an individual. In such cases, direct
effect leads to a change in the factual circumstances which precede the norms in
which an obligation is imposed upon an individual. In other words, it leads to
mere adverse repercussions.
The normative impact theory is based on the distinction between the
norms directly governing the dispute to be resolved on the one hand, and
the factual framework to which these norms are applied on the other. ‘Factual’
is thus meant in a relative sense: the factual framework consists of all circum-
stances which are taken to be true for the purposes of the dispute. These
factual circumstances always include normative components in themselves.205
In Wells, for example, the factual circumstances include the fact that the
quarry owner needs development consent to exploit the quarry (among
many other rules). However, relative to the dispute under litigation, these
normatively-laden circumstances are considered to be the facts to which an-
other norms is applied.206
As we will show in the following section, the normative impact theory ac-
curately describes the existing case law. Moreover, recently, in Smith, the Court
clarified its case law on the distinction between ‘direct obligations’ and ‘mere
adverse repercussions’ in a manner that appears to endorse our approach—albeit
by using different terminology.207
205 The distinction between fact and norm is never absolute, as seemingly factual expressions often
have implicit normative implications. See eg JR Searle, ‘How to Derive “Ought” From “Is”’ (1964)
73 Philosophical Review, 43; and Speech Acts: An Essay in the Philosophy of Language (Cambridge
University Press, 1969). This also applies to law: RJ Allen and MS Pardo, ‘The Myth of the Law–Fact
Distinction’ (2003) 97 Northwestern University Law Review, 1769.
206 Relativity is common in many legal dichotomies, such as substance–form and substance–pro-
cedure. On this see J Gardner, ‘The Supposed Formality of the Rule of Law’ in Law as a Leap of Faith:
Essays on Law in General (Oxford University Press, 2012), 198–204.
207 Smith (n 6), para. 53.
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B. The case law on direct effect through the lens of the normative
impact theory
The normative impact theory reconciles the alleged inconsistencies in the case
law of the ECJ from the perspective of the theories reviewed in Section IV, while
remaining in keeping with the normative validity of the relationship between
primacy on the one hand, and legality and legal certainty on the other.
Illustrating the normative impact theory first through the ‘incidental effects’
cases (Section V.B.i), prior to turning to the horizontal and inverse vertical
direct effect cases (Section V.B.ii), helps to explain how our approach functions.
(i) The incidental effects case law
In CIA Security, the factual circumstances of the case consisted of the negative
publicity circulated by CIA’s competitors, Signalson and Securitel. To establish
whether these factual actions were in breach of the relevant norm on unfair
practices, another factual circumstance needed to be assessed, concerning CIA’s
alarm system which had to be marketed according to the relevant norm on
alarm systems standards. Direct effect plays a role in this second situation. As a
result of the direct effect of the Notification Directive, CIA’s alarm system
complied with the norms on alarm system standards. This results in the factual
conclusion that Signalson and Securitel’s claims as regards CIA’s conduct were
untruthful. Therefore, based on the norms of unfair commercial practices, they
can be compelled to cease their practices. As we can see, direct effect did not
alter the norm imposing this obligation. It only had an effect on the factual
circumstances which preceded the assessment of Signalson and Securitel’s be-
haviour under the norms on unfair commercial practices.
Similar constructions can be found in Unilever v SmithKline and Unilever
Italia. The first case concerned an action for an injunction sought by
Unilever against SmithKline for misleading advertising, due to statements on
toothpaste tubes which, according to Unilever, violated national cosmetic law.
SmithKline, by contrast, contended that national law violated Council Directive
76/768/EEC.208 Invoking this Directive had the effect of disapplying the rele-
vant national law, with the result that the statements on toothpaste tubes were
not contrary to any applicable law. This fact had the mere adverse repercussion
for Unilever that its action for injunction had no basis in law.209 Similarly and
more well-known, Unilever Italia concerned a dispute which was adjudicated
under Italian contact law, but where the answer to the legal question related to
the contractual dispute depended on the factual question whether the olive oil
delivered to Central Food by Unilever complied with the norms on the labelling
208 Council Directive 76/768/EEC of 27 July 1976 on the approximation of the laws of the Member
States relating to cosmetic products [1976] OJ L262/169.
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of olive oil. It is in the latter circumstance that direct effect plays a role—not on
the applicable rules on the law of contract.
Another unruly horse to other doctrinal constructions of the Court’s case law,
Ruiz Berna´ldez, can be explained by the normative impact theory as well. It
should be noted that Ruiz Berna´ldez was limited to questions on the compati-
bility of national law with Directive 87/102/EEC.210 From a scientific point of
view, the case is better conceived as involving questions on the compatibility of
national law with an EU directive.211 However, the normative impact theory
illustrates that the outcome of the case would have been no different had an
explicit question on the invocability of the relevant Directive been asked. In
Ruiz Berna´ldez, the victim of a car accident caused by an intoxicated Mr Ruiz
Berna´ldez claimed damages from Ruiz Berna´ldez’s motor vehicle insurance
company. The insurance company relied on national law allowing it to ex-
clude damage caused while intoxicated from the scope of motor vehicle insur-
ance contracts. Such exclusion clauses are prohibited by Article 11 of Directive
87/102/EEC. Accordingly, invoking this Directive modified the norms govern-
ing the contractual relationship between Mr Ruiz Berna´ldez and his insurance
company. From the perspective of the dispute between the victim of the car
accident and Ruiz Berna´ldez’s insurance company, the question of whether the
insurance contract covers damage caused under intoxication is of a factual
nature. Once it is established that, as a matter of fact, Ruiz Berna´ldez had an
insurance covering the kind of damage he caused, Mr Ruiz Berna´ldez’s insur-
ance company was obligated to pay compensation. As such, Ruiz Berna´ldez is
similar to CIA Security and Unilever Italia. In other words, direct effect modified
the norms concerning the contractual relationship between Ruiz Berna´ldez and
his insurance company, which was subsequently considered to be part of the
factual circumstances that are taken to be true in the context of the civil liability
case between Ruiz Berna´ldez and his insurance company, on the one hand, and
the victim, on the other. The fact that the insurance company is obligated to
cover damages incurred by Ruiz Berna´ldez in this civil liability case is a mere
adverse repercussion of invoking the Directive in the preceding contractual
relationship.
Ostensibly, the recent Smith case reveals a similar factual situation. As the rear
of Mr Meade’s van was not designed and constructed with seating accommoda-
tion, Meade’s motor insurer FBD refused to provide him an indemnity on the
basis of its insurance policy, which was in conformity with Section 65(1)(a)(i) of
the Irish Road Traffic Act, defining persons not sitting in seating accommoda-
tion as ‘excluded persons’ not having a right to insurance compensation. While
Mr Smith relied on Article 1 of Directive 90/232/EEC to claim compensation,
210 Directive 87/102/EEC (n 82).
211 See Section VI below, which discusses Bellone (n 51); Centrosteel C-456/98, EU:C:2000:402; and
Stadt Wiener Neustadt (n 7).
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the ECJ held that this would entail horizontal direct effect against FBD, thus
rejecting Smith’s claim.212 The Court distinguished Smith from Ruiz Berna´ldez
by pointing out that the question of direct effect was not addressed in the latter
case.213
Indeed, as we will show in Section VI below, the functioning of the prelim-
inary reference procedure significantly affects the relevance of individual cases
for the doctrine of direct effect. Nevertheless, in addition to this argument, the
normative impact theory suggests there is also a substantive difference between
Ruiz Berna´ldez and Smith that legitimizes the different outcomes. As observed
above, in Ruiz Berna´ldez there is a clear demarcation between the norms gov-
erning the contractual relationship between Ruiz Berna´ldez and his insurance
company (the exclusion of coverage for damage caused while being intoxicated),
and the subsequent norms governing the civil liability case between Ruiz
Berna´ldez and its insurance company, on the one hand, and the victim, on
the other (the existence of an obligation to compensate the victim). In Smith,
no such demarcation exists because the exclusion clause did not merely define the
contractual relationship between Meade and FBD, but also directly addressed
Mr Smith himself by excluding a specific category of victims from the scope of
the obligation to compensation. Using the Wells formula, it is clear that in this
case invocability results in horizontal direct effect: invoking the Directive to
remove the clause excluding an obligation to compensate the damage of
Mr Smith is directly linked to the performance of the obligation to compensate
Mr Smith, which is precisely the obligation pursuant to Article 1 of Directive
90/232/EEC.
A peculiar set of facts in relation to direct effect can be seen in Pafitis. In this
case, Article 25 of Directive 77/91/EEC was invoked by the old shareholders of
a Greek bank against a capital increase which had been independently decided
by the temporary administrator of the bank. Article 25 required that any in-
crease in capital was decided upon by the general meeting of shareholders. The
Court held that Article 25 of the Directive could indeed be invoked by the old
shareholders, as a result of which two types of negative consequences can be
identified. The new shareholders lost their shares, which should be considered a
mere adverse repercussion of the nullity of the capital increase. Akin to the mere
adverse repercussions in Wells, the nullity of the new shareholders’ shares was an
automatic, factual consequence of the successful invocability of the Directive
against the decision of the temporary administrator of the bank. In contrast,
212 Smith (n 6), para. 55.
213 Smith (n 6), para. 50. It should be noted that this paragraph does not state that the ECJ would
have denied direct effect in Ruiz Berna´ldez had the question on direct effect been asked. The most
plain meaning of this passage is that references to Ruiz Berna´ldez in the context of direct effect are
misplaced as direct effect was not discussed in that case, as mentioned above. However, there is
definitely a suggestion that direct effect would have been denied, but such a hypothetically wrong
result may have been caused by the phrasing of the preliminary reference by the national court, as we
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the Directive directly imposed an obligation upon the bank and its temporary
administrator to annul the capital increase. However, looking closely at the facts
of this case, it becomes apparent that the Greek bank concerned cannot be con-
sidered an ordinary private entity. The Greek bank had been put under the
supervision of a temporary administrator. Under Greek law, this supervision
was possible if ‘such action is necessary and urgent in order to safeguard the
interests of the State, the bank or third parties, or to forestall possible adverse
repercussions on the financial market or the economy in general’.214 Accordingly,
as known by the ECJ,215 it is clear that the Greek bank itself could no longer be
regarded as a private party, but should be considered part of the Greek State under
the Marshall and Foster case law.216 The direct obligations for the bank as a result
of the invocability of Directive 77/91/EEC thus represent vertical direct effect,
while the consequences for the new shareholders were mere adverse repercussions.
(ii) The case law affirming the prohibition of horizontal and inverse vertical
direct effect
The difference between obligations and mere adverse repercussions becomes clearer
when the case law discussed in the previous section are compared to Faccini Dori
and Pfeiffer. In Faccini Dori the legal question under scrutiny by the judge was
whether Mrs Faccini Dori should pay for the language course she had bought at
Milan central station. The answer to this question is not dependent upon the
evaluation of any preceding circumstances. The fact that Mrs Faccini Dori
bought a genuine language course was not disputed, and it was not disputed
either that this transaction was valid and complied with the law on selling tech-
niques, possible product standards, etc. A directive was invoked in this case to
change the norms of Italian contract law. It is only by changing the rule that a
contractual party has to pay for the performance delivered by the other contractual
party that Mrs Faccini Dori could escape contractual liability. Were the directive to
apply, the language course seller would have had to refrain from providing the
language course (or would have to take it back) and would have to refrain from
seeking payment for it. This would have been in every way a case in which direct
effect changes a norm to impose an obligation upon an individual.217
There is a similar construction in Pfeiffer. This dispute concerned a situation
where an employer requires its employees to work longer than 48 hours weekly.
The resolution of this situation depended on the applicable norm on weekly
working hours. No other circumstance needed to be assessed prior to assessing
the one in dispute in Pfeiffer. That the employee had a contract for work and got
214 Opinion of AG Tesauro in Pafitis C-441/93, EU:C:1995:368, para. 3.
215 See ibid para. 25; Pafitis (n 143), paras 4–6, 12.
216 Reaching the similar conclusion as regards the legal nature of the bank, Lackhoff and Nyssens (n
56), 399; and Colgan (n 56), 551.
217 For a similar result in a case concerning non-contractual liability, see Daihatsu C-97/96,
EU:C:1997:581.
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paid for the hours worked was not in dispute. Neither in dispute were the norms
concerning the establishment of working relationships and the payment of
working hours. Direct effect in this case was invoked to change the norm on
the number of hours which may be worked weekly. It was only by changing this
rule that Mr Pfeiffer and others could force their employer to reduce the
number of hours they were expected to work each week. Like Faccini Dori, in
this case direct effect would have changed the norm to impose an obligation
upon an individual in a dispute before a national court.
In the inverse direct effect cases the relationship between direct effect and the
obligations upon individuals is even more straightforward. In Kolpinghuis,
Berlusconi, Arcaro, and Pretore di Salo´, the imposition of obligations upon indi-
viduals depended on the norm used to qualify their behaviour. In Berlusconi,
regardless of whether direct effect was allowed, the applicable norm for resolving
the case was in any case a norm from national law. In contrast, in Kolpinghuis
direct effect would entail application of the directive itself, ie a substitution effect.
Nevertheless, in both cases, direct effect of the respective directives would directly
impact the norms to be applied to solve the cases themselves, regardless of whether
that norm is of national law, such as in Berlusconi, or of the relevant directive, as
in Kolpinghuis. What matters is that, in all these cases, direct effect would have
changed the norm to impose obligations upon individuals. This shows how the
normative impact theory differs from the substitution–exclusion theory and, as a
result, elucidates judgments that remain otherwise obscure.
Somewhere in between Wells, CIA, Unilever, on the one hand, and Faccini
Dori, Pfeiffer, and the criminal law proceedings, on the other hand, we have El
Corte Ingle´s. Indeed, although it seemed like a consumer case similar to Faccini
Dori, this case presented a somewhat more complex situation. The dispute
between El Corte Ingle´s and Mrs Bla´zquez Rivero for the reimbursement of
the credit loan given by the former to the latter followed a dispute about the
non(-adequate) performance of a travel contract between Mrs Bla´zquez Rivero
and Viajes El Corte Ingle´s SA. This case is thus more similar to CIA Security and
Unilever than Faccini Dori and Pfeiffer, with one important difference. In El
Corte Ingle´s direct effect was not invoked to qualify the performance of the travel
contract. It is invoked instead to hold the finance company accountable. Clearly,
here direct effect would have modified the norms establishing the liability of an
individual, leading thus, if allowed, to the direct imposition of an obligation.
In administrative law, similar constructions could also be possible. A good
example of such a situation would be a case in which a party requests a public
authority to undertake enforcement action against a private party due to a
breach of an unimplemented obligation stemming from a directive. Take for
example the Environmental Liability Directive.218 It requires operators of
218 Directive 2004/35/EC on environmental liability with regard to the prevention and remedying of
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economic activities, business, or undertakings, to take certain measures to
prevent or remediate environmental damage.219 In the absence of national
measures transposing the Directive, a party cannot force the competent au-
thority to rely on Article 5 or 6 of the Directive against an operator who failed
to comply with any of these provisions. If this were possible, it would imply
the imposition on the operator of an obligation stemming directly from the
Directive.220 Indeed, direct effect would in this case determine which norm
had to be imposed upon the operator, as also occurred in Kolpinghuis,
Berlusconi, Arcaro, and Pretore di Salo´. Whether the enforcement measures
are explicitly mentioned in the EU provisions at hand, as in the case of
Article 4(5) of Directive 1999/22/EC relating to the keeping of wild animals
in zoos,221 is irrelevant in this regard.222 If invoked, they would change the
norm to impose an obligation upon individuals, hence entail the direct im-
position of obligations from a directive upon an individual. A conjunctive
perspective on both Berlusconi and (hypothetical) cases involving the invoca-
tion of provisions from the Environmental Liability Directive shows how the
normative impact of invocability must be dissociated from the question of
whether the respective provisions includes in its material and personal scope
the actions of private parties. Invoking a directive can change the norm directly
governing the dispute—entailing the imposition of an obligation onto an in-
dividual—regardless of whether the directive is aimed at regulating private
party actions.
Figure 1 shows graphically the functioning of the normative impact theory in
the three scenarios discussed in this section, as well as in Section V.B.i.
In conclusion, this section and Section V.B.i. showed that the normative
impact theory is capable of explaining the meaning of the direct obligations
versus mere adverse repercussions dichotomy and of reconciling all cases in
which the Court explicitly discussed the issue of the invocability of direct
effect of directives. It therefore has descriptive accuracy. Moreover, it has nor-
mative desirability as it reconciles primacy with legality and legal certainty in a
more refined manner than the substitution–exclusion theory, thereby decreasing
the risk of false negative outcomes in allowing for the invocability of directives.
Conceiving direct effect as invocability, the normative impact theory more ac-
curately grasps the normative effects of invoking a directive on the applicable
legal framework(s) and the question of what it means to impose an obligation
on to an individual.
219 Arts 5 (on prevention) and 6 (on remedying environmental damage).
220 See also JH Jans and HHB Vedder, European Environmental Law (4th edn, Europa Law
Publishing, 2012), 210.
221 Council Directive 1999/22/EC relating to the keeping of wild animals in zoos [1999] OJ L94/24.
222 Cf Jans and Vedder (n 220), 199–200.
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VI. The preliminary reference procedure and the borderline between
direct and indirect effect
A possible critique to our claim that the normative impact theory has descriptive
accuracy could be based on two cases in which the Court, while not explicitly
discussing direct effect, held that national law was not compatible with the
invoked directives, namely Bellone and Stadt Wiener Neustadt. Following the
normative impact theory, both cases would have to be qualified as involving,
Figure 1 Graphic representation of the normative impact approach*
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respectively, horizontal and inverse vertical direct effect of the relevant directives.
However, this critique fails to appreciate the relevance of the preliminary refer-
ence procedure on the discussion on horizontal direct effect of directives. As we
will show in this section, Bellone and Stadt Wiener Neustadt suggest the existence
of a presumption of the possibility of consistent interpretation insofar as the
preliminary reference does not address the question of direct effect itself. This
interpretation, supported by the Court’s judgment in Centrosteel, points at the
intricate borderline between indirect and direct effect, and the Court’s ‘stone-
by-stone approach’ to developing its jurisprudence.223 Implicit support is also
given by Smith, where the Court recalled the absence of an obligation under EU
law to give horizontal direct effect to directives when it is established that ‘the
national court finds itself unable to interpret provisions of its national law in a
manner that is compatible with a directive’.224 We will illustrate the operation of
this presumption in Section VI.A. In Section VI.B, we further discuss a related
issue of the functioning of the preliminary reference procedure, namely the
manner in which the national court formulates the relevant national legal frame-
work as well as its questions. To this end, we explain how the Court might have
reached a wrong conclusion in Ruiz Berna´ldez, had the issue of direct effect been
raised explicitly by the national court. Lastly, in Section VI.C we conclude that
the Court should not be afraid to address the dimension of direct effect expli-
citly even if it is not explicitly raised by the national court. This would avoid
misunderstandings related to the borderline between direct and indirect effect,
the presumption of consistent interpretation, as well as the distinction between
direct obligations and mere adverse repercussions, without threatening the un-
deniable truth that the Court tends to solve only one case at a time.
A. The possibility of consistent interpretation
The relevance of the preliminary reference procedure for the interpretation of
cases seemingly concerning direct effect was observed by some commentators on
incidental effects case law. They observed that in Bellone, as well as Ruiz
Berna´ldez, the referring national court did not ask whether the litigant could
invoke a directive against another individual, arguably restricting the scope of
the reference to the compatibility of national legislation with the applicable
directives.225 While it is true that Ruiz Berna´ldez is likely to be qualified as a
223 On the ‘stone-by-stone’ approach, see Lenaerts (n 11). For criticism, see JHH Weiler, ‘Epilogue:
Judging the Judges—Apology and Critique’ in M Adams et al. (eds), Judging Europe’s Judges (Hart
Publishing, 2013).
224 Smith (n 6), para. 49.
225 JC Moitinho de Almeida, ‘L’effet direct des directives, l’interpre´tation conforme du droit na-
tional et la jurisprudence de la Cour Supreme de Justice portugaise’ in N Colneric et al. (eds), Une
communaute´ de droit. Festschrift fu¨r Gil Carlos Rodriguez Iglesias (BWV Berliner Wissenshafts, 2003),
237: ‘Quant aux arreeˆts Berna´ldez et Bellone . . . il y a lieu d’observer que la Cour s’est limite´e a´
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scenario 1 situation, as we have argued above, the same does not apply to
Bellone.
Bellone concerned a contractual dispute between Mrs Bellone and Yokohama
SpA. Mrs Bellone acted as commercial agent on behalf of Yokohama pursuant to
an agency contract.226 After Yokohama terminated this contract, Bellone
claimed payment of various indemnities. These claims were initially rejected
on the ground that the agency contract was void, as Mrs Bellone was not
registered in the register of commercial agents, which was a compulsory con-
tractual form on the basis of Article 9 of Italian Law No 204. On appeal, Mrs
Bellone invoked Article 1 of Directive 86/653/EEC which defines ‘commercial
agent’ by reference to the activity pursued and does not require any other
registration measures.227 The Court indeed confirmed that the registration re-
quirement in Italian law was incompatible with the Directive.228 The direct
effect of Article 1 through either an exclusionary effect or a substitution effect229
would directly impact the norms governing the dispute between Mrs Bellone
and Yokohama, since the disapplication of Article 9 directly confirms the exist-
ence of an agency contract between Mrs Bellone and Yokohama, thus determin-
ing the question of whether Mrs Bellone had any right to indemnities. Under
the normative impact theory, the case involves a direct obligation. Nevertheless,
the Court ignored the horizontal nature of the dispute.
Subsequently in Centrosteel, shortly after Bellone, another Italian national
court referred an identical question to the Court with reference to Bellone.
The referring court noted that Bellone could not result in Law No 204 being
disapplied in the proceedings before it, since this would entail a horizontal direct
effect of Directive 86/653/EEC. The Court in turn observed that indeed dir-
ectives cannot of themselves impose obligations on individuals. But, the Court
emphasized, the case law also requires national courts to interpret their national
law as far as possible in light of the wording and purposes of applicable direct-
ives. It continued:
As the Advocate General points out in paragraph 36 of his Opinion, it seems in that
regard that the Corte Suprema di Cassazione (Supreme Court of Cassation), following
the judgment in Bellone, has changed its case-law so that a failure to comply with the
obligation prescribed by Law No 204 to be entered in the register of commercial
agents and representatives no longer entails the nullity of an agency contract in Italian
re´pondre aux questions pose´es, sans attirer l’attention des jurisdictions nationales sur l’exclusion de
l’effet direct horizontal’. See also, van Gerven (n 51), 259f and Stuyck (n 51).
226 Bellone (n 51), paras 2–7.
227 [1986] OJ L382/17.
228 Bellone (n 51), paras 13–18.
229 Whether or not exclusionary effects suffice would depend on whether Italian law had a separate,
substantive, definition of ‘commercial agent’ to which the registration requirement was supplemen-
tary, or not. In the affirmative case, exclusion of the registration requirement would be enough, in the
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law. [T]he case pending before [the referring] court may be resolved on the basis of the
Directive and the case-law of the Court of Justice on the effects of directives.230
Hence, the Court emphasizes the link between the incompatibility of national
law with the Directive and the obligation of national courts to remedy this
incompatibility by interpreting the national provisions applicable, so far as
possible, in light of the Directive.231 In the absence of any indication provided
by the national court that this incompatibility cannot be remedied through
consistent interpretation, the Court indeed appears to continue under the pre-
sumption that consistent interpretation is possible. Accordingly, Centrosteel
shows that Bellone is not relevant to the development of the doctrine of direct
effect and thus is not an anomaly in the case law.
A similar conclusion can be reached as regards Stadt Wiener Neustadt in the
context of a triangular situation and a possible inverse vertical effect. Like Wells
and Salzburger Flughafen, this case also concerned the invocability of the EIA
Directive. However, rather than an action for annulment of development con-
sent granted in breach of the EIA Directive, as was the case in Salzburger
Flughafen, Stadt Wiener Neustadt concerned a request for remedial action against
the negative effects of a development consent granted in breach of the EIA
Directive requirements, which had become definitive under national law. In
2014, a request by the Environmental Ombudsman to determine whether the
plant should be subjected to an EIA in accordance with the UVP-G 2000 was
rejected on the basis of Paragraph 46(20)(4) UVP-G 2000, stating that projects
the consent for which is no longer at risk of annulment, as in this case, must be
regarded as having been authorized in compliance with the requirements for an
environmental impact assessment. The ECJ considered whether Paragraph
46(20)(4) UVP-G 2000 could be invoked to reject a request for remedial
230 Centrosteel (n 211), paras 17–18. In Dansk Industri (n 3), para. 33, the Court refers to this
paragraph to infer that ‘[i]t should be noted in that connection that the requirement to interpret
national law in conformity with EU law entails the obligation for national courts to change its
established case-law, where necessary, if it is based on an interpretation of national law that is
incompatible with the objectives of a directive’ (repeated in Egenberger v Evangelisches Werk fu¨r
Diakonie und Entwicklung C-414/16, EU:C:2018:257, para. 72; and IR v JQ C-68/17,
EU:C:2018:696, para. 64). However, this is an apparent misreading of para. 17 of Centrosteel,
which only states as a matter of fact that the Corte Suprema di Cassazione had changed its established
case law. This argument thus violates the so-called ‘is–ought gap’ according to which a normative
statement can never be inferred from a factual statement. The ‘is–ought’ gap is sometimes referred to
as ‘Hume’s Law’ after David Hume’s famous observations in A Treatise of Human Nature, ed. by L
Amherst Selby-Bigge and PH Nidditch (Oxford University Press, 1978), 469–70, although the
discussions on the ‘is–ought’ gap trace back to pre-Humean philosophy (for an overview, see AN
Prior, Logic and the Basis of Ethics (Clarendon Press, 1949). While Searle (n 206) claimed to derive an
‘ought statement’ from an ‘is statement’ based on his critique of the fact/value distinction, his
attempt is deeply contested and appears to be fallacious. See eg RM Hare, ‘The Promising Game’
(1964) 70 Revue internationale de philosophie, 398. Rather, many seemingly factual statements include
normative dimensions, as we recognize in the normative impact theory (see the text accompanying n
206).
231 Centrosteel (n 211), para. 19.
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action against the failure to perform an environmental impact assessment, as
made by the Environmental Ombudsman, and found in the affirmative.
Unlike Wells and Salzburger Flughafen, in this case the negative consequences
of this obligation for national authorities for the operator of a waste treatment
facility will not flow automatically from the decision of the national court to
annul the negative reply of the Government of the Land to the request by the
Environmental Ombudsman. Once this decision is annulled, the Government
of the Land will need to decide whether the project had to be subjected to an
EIA. The outcome of the assessment by the Environmental Ombudsman will be
a new, autonomous decision, and this decision could be that a full-fledged EIA
must be performed. If an EIA must be performed indeed, and paragraph 46 of
the Court’s ruling hints in this direction, the consent could be suspended or
withdrawn while waiting the results of the impact assessment.232
The question of how the content of this new, autonomous decision can be
squared with the prohibition of inverse vertical direct effect was not part of the
preliminary reference, and the Court paid no attention to this matter at all.
However, if we consider Stadt Wiener Neustadt in light of the Court’s explan-
ation of Bellone in Centrosteel, it becomes clear that the question of the direct
effect of the EIA Directive is not only not explicitly discussed in the judgment,
but also that the question of direct effect is not (yet) relevant as long as there is a
presumption that consistent interpretation is capable of remedying the conflict
at hand. Hence, in the absence of a specific confirmation by the referring na-
tional court that consistent interpretation is impossible, the Court proceeds on
the presumption that the incompatibility of national law with the EIA Directive
can be solved through consistent interpretation.233 Under this presumption the
question of direct effect is to be considered a purely hypothetical question which
lies outside the scope of the preliminary reference procedure.234
B. The formulation of the relevant national legal framework and the
preliminary question
The second manner in which the functioning of the preliminary reference pro-
cedure has affected the case law on direct effect of directives is the manner in
which the referring court presents the relevant national legal framework. Again,
232 Cf JH Jans and AT Marseille, ‘Competence Remains Competence? Reopening Decisions That
Violate Community Law’ (2007) 1 Review of European Administrative Law, 75.
233 This however puts in an interesting light the case of Dansk Industri (n 3). In this case, the national
court did confirm that consistent interpretation of the case law of the Danish Supreme Court so as to
avoid conflict with Directive 2000/78/EC was impossible. By contrast, the ECJ insisted that the
referring court was too quick in giving up the possibility of consistent interpretation (para. 34),
which does create the odd impression that the ECJ is better at interpreting Danish law than Danish
courts.
234 See by contrast also Smith (n 6), paras 32, 34–41, 49. On hypothetical preliminary questions, see
generally M Broberg and N Fenger, Preliminary References to the European Court of Justice (Oxford
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Ruiz Berna´ldez in conjunction with Smith provides an illustrative example. As
noted above, there are two potential explanations as regards the analytical rela-
tionship between these two cases. In Smith, the Court distinguishes Smith from
Ruiz Berna´ldez by observing that the scope of the preliminary reference in the
latter case was confined to the compatibility of national law with EU law.235 It
suggests, therefore, that had the referring national court in Ruiz Berna´ldez spe-
cifically raised the question of direct effect, the Court would have answered that
the relevant Directive may not be invoked because of the prohibition of hori-
zontal direct effect. By contrast, using the normative impact theory, we hypothe-
sized in Section V.B.i. above that the phrasing of the relevant national legal
framework in Ruiz Berna´ldez was such that invoking the Directive would not
lead to direct obligations for the insurance company, because the Directive only
governs the contractual relationship between Ruiz Berna´ldez and his insurance
company, not their relationship with the victim of the car accident.
However, looking at the manner in which the national court had referred the
case to the ECJ, we admit that it is unlikely that the Court would have allowed
for direct effect in response to a hypothetical question to this end. In its refer-
ence, the national court presented to the Court Article 12(3)(b) of the
Reglamento del Seguro Obligatorio, which, as noted above, excludes from in-
surance coverage all damage that is caused by an intoxicated driver. The national
court, in doubt as to whether this article is in conformity with Community
directives relating to insurance against civil liability in respect of the use of
motor vehicles, was not certain whether:
Article 12(3)(b) of the Reglamento del Seguro Obligatorio could be interpreted as
meaning that the insurer did not have to compensate the victim of a road-traffic accident
caused by an intoxicated driver.236
The emphasis added to this section is to illustrate that in the preliminary
reference, the national court focuses on the actual result of applying the
Directive. This result of applying this Directive is that the insurance company
would not have to indemnify Mr Ruiz Berna´ldez for damages liable to the
victim. In practice, of course, this would mean that the insurance company
would not have to compensate the victim. Assuming that this result would
not have been possible through consistent interpretation,237 the question still
remains whether the insurer having to compensate the victim is a direct obliga-
tion or a mere adverse repercussion. However, emphasizing again the ultimate
consequence of direct effect, the actual question asked by the national court was:
235 Smith (n 6), para. 50.
236 Ruiz Berna´ldez (n 51), para. 4 (emphasis added).
237 In that case, of course, there would not have been a problem of horizontal direct effect in the first
place.
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If a statutory provision or contractual clause which excludes insurance cover where the
driver responsible for the damage is intoxicated is valid in relations between the insurer
and the insured, could its validity as against a third party who has suffered harm be
considered to be in compliance with the system laid down in Directives 72/166/EEC,
84/5/EEC and 90/232/EEC?238
Also here, the national court emphasizes the relationship between the insurer
and the victim. A direct effect of the Directive would clearly affect this rela-
tionship, suggesting a horizontal direct effect. It is not inconceivable that the
Court, had it based a hypothetical answer to a question of direct effect on this
phrasing of the preliminary question, would have concluded that invoking the
Directive was not allowed in this case, for it would have entailed an obligation—
that otherwise did not exist—on the insurer to compensate the victim. Only by
very precisely looking at the relevant national legal framework and the norms
directly affected by the invocability of the Directive can one distinguish the
direct effect of invoking the Directive (the altered insurance relationship be-
tween Ruiz Berna´ldez and his insurer), and the miscellaneous consequences that
this entails (the indemnification of Ruiz Berna´ldez for damages liable to the
victim).
This conclusion may suggest that the normative impact theory is also too
formalistic—just like the substitution–exclusion theory—in that the question of
whether a directive can have direct effect depends at least in some cases on the
way in which the national legal framework is formulated, and how the national
court presents it to the ECJ. However, unlike the substitution–exclusion theory,
the normative impact theory remains better in keeping with the distinction
between imposing direct obligations and entailing mere adverse repercussions.
The substitution–exclusion theory necessarily produces false positive and false
negative outcomes in light of the rationale of the prohibitions of inverse vertical
and horizontal direct effect: as shown above, for example, invocabilite´ d’exclusion
is clearly capable of entailing obligations that are a direct normative consequence
of invoking a directive.239 By contrast, the normative impact theory is precisely
premised on the distinction between direct obligations and mere adverse reper-
cussions that are indirect.
Of course, this theory is as formulaic as any other;240 the reach of direct effect
has always been ‘l’art du possible’, as Pescatore has already observed.241
Nevertheless, we submit that the normative impact theory accurately describes
what is possible in terms of the horizontal direct effect of directives. Inevitably,
238 Ruiz Berna´ldez (n 51), para. 5 (emphasis added).
239 See Section IV.C. above and Berlusconi (n 42) in particular.
240 See also n 192 and accompanying text.
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this creates the situation where the formulation of the relevant national legal
framework (both in the law itself and how the national court presents it to the
ECJ), at least in some cases, becomes essential to the question of whether a
directive can be invoked in a horizontal or an inverse vertical dispute.242 This
makes it even more important that there is clear communication between na-
tional courts and the ECJ in terms of the scope of the preliminary reference
procedure and the manner in which national law is formulated, but also the
scope of the answer of the ECJ. In light of the limited information that is
available to the Court, its judgments in preliminary reference cases must be
scrutinized carefully to deduce not only what the Court says, but in response to
what it is saying this, and thus how its judgment should be understood.
C. Deciding one case at a time (but not less)
As Lenaerts and Corthaut observe, the preliminary reference proceedings in-
creasingly reveal the impact of invocability questions on the outcome of indi-
vidual cases.243 As the Court considers itself bound by the scope of the specific
questions asked by the referring court,244 it is not unreasonable for it not to fully
take into account all possible follow-up situations which may or may not arise
after its judgment is applied by the referring national court. In this regard, it is
logical to presume that consistent interpretation is a viable option for the na-
tional court as the first and normatively preferred mechanism to remedy deficits
in the proper implementation of EU directives. Moreover, the Court is clearly
applying a ‘one case at a time’ method of adjudication245—or in other words, a
‘stone-by-stone approach’246—which explains the absence of dicta that are not
directly relevant to the preliminary questions asked by the referring national
court.
On the other hand, precisely because the preliminary reference procedure is
the fundamental communication mechanism between the national and the EU
courts, presuming that the logical consequences of a preliminary judgment—
even if formally outside the scope of the Article 267 procedure—must be dealt
with by the national court without guidance by the Court is not without
risks.247 The same applies to the presumption that any follow-up issues,
242 Another case where the formulation of the national legal framework is essential to the question of
whether direct effect is possible, also in conjunction with the possibility of consistent interpretation
to solve the incompatibility concerned, is Stadt Wiener Neustadt (n 7).
243 Lenaerts and Corthaut (n 8), 514–15.
244 But see the ex officio analysis of direct effect in Daihatsu (n 217), and in Riunione Adriatica di
Sicurta` SpA (RAS) v Dario Lo Bue C-233/01, EU:C:2002:621; and more generally the Court’s
tendency to rephrase questions.
245 See CR Sunstein, One Case at a Time: Judicial Minimalism on the Supreme Court (Harvard
University Press, 2001).
246 Lenaerts (n 11).
247 On the risks associated with follow-up judgments, see S Bogojevic´, ‘Judicial Dialogue Unpacked:
Twenty Years of Preliminary References on Environmental Matters Initiated by the Swedish
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including not least the possibility of interpreting national law in conformity
with EU law, are not to be addressed by the Court right away, but are to be
addressed by the national court, potentially leading to another preliminary ref-
erence procedure.248 Moreover, sometimes it is not unreasonable to conclude
that the Court does not even solve a full case at a time, which is damaging to the
preliminary procedure, trust among courts, and the effectiveness and uniform
application of EU law.249
For these reasons, it is advisable that the Court should be more careful in
handling cases (potentially) having an invocability dimension. It certainly would
not hurt to emphasize obiter dictum the obligation of national courts to remedy
incompatible national law through consistent interpretation, as well as the well-
established case law on the limits to direct effect.250 This would also avoid
misunderstandings of the Court’s case law to the extent that the information
supplied by the national court might incline the Court to reach conclusions that
are inconsistent with its own case law. As Ruiz Berna´ldez illustrates, the manner
in which national courts phrase their references might—accidentally—entail a
wrong conclusion on part of the Court. Moreover, because the presumption of
the possibility of consistent interpretation has never been explicitly acknowl-
edged by the Court as such, right conclusions on part of the Court may never-
theless be wrongly interpreted by legal academics, national courts, and
practitioners, leading to an unnecessary avalanche of legal commentary and
widespread confusion in the legal community.251 Being more explicit on all
the legal principles and doctrines that apply to the national dispute at hand
would help to avoid such (potentially far-reaching) misunderstandings.
Judiciary’ (2017) 29 Journal of Environmental Law, 263; L Squintani and J Rakipi, ‘Judicial
Cooperation in Environmental Matters’ (2018) 20 Environmental Law Review, 89; and L
Squintani and D Annink, ‘Judicial Cooperation in Environmental Matters: Mapping National
Courts’ Behaviour in Follow-up Cases’ (2018) 15 Journal For European Environmental &
Planning Law, 147.
248 This is exactly what happened in the follow-up judgment to Niselli (n 189) where the national
court after receiving the answer of the Court of Justice highlighting the incompatibility of the
national norm with the EU one at hand in that case, had doubts about the invocability of that
norm in the criminal proceedings again Mr Niselli, and therefore decided to make a new preliminary
reference, this time to the Italian Constitutional Court, see Tribunale di Terni, Procedimento penale a
carico di Antonio Niselli, Ordinanza No. 546 of 29 June 2005 as discussed in L Squintani ‘Judicial
Cooperation in Environmental Matters: Mapping National Courts’ Behaviour in Follow-up Cases in
Italy’ (MS).
249 See D Sarmiento, ‘Half a Case at a Time: Dealing with Judicial Minimalism at the European
Court of Justice’ in M Claes et al. (eds), Constitutional Conversations in Europe: Actors, Topics and
Procedures (Intersentia, 2012).
250 In this regard, it is, however, useful to recall that the prohibition of horizontal direct effect as first
introduced in Marshall (n 37) was strictly speaking obiter dictum, since the employer of Ms Marshall
was a public authority, as observed by A Arnull, The European Union and its Court of Justice (Oxford
University Press, 2006), 631.
251 We of course refer to the ‘incidental effects’ case law, and also Bellone (n 51), Ruiz Berna´ldez (n
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VII. Conclusions
Direct effect cannot be seen as an infant disease of EU law, or merely a matter of
justiciability. As long as the EU legal order and the national legal orders are not
fully assimilated, and EU norms are to a large extent enforced through the
administrative and adjudicative fora of the Member States, further theory-build-
ing on the invocability of EU law remains necessary.
This article has provided a first step in this direction through four claims.
First, after providing a bird’s eye view of the development of direct effect case
law and the main theories that have tried to theorize direct effect in general and
of directives specifically, we clarified the case law on the direct effect of directives
in inverse vertical, triangular, and horizontal disputes. We did so by showing
that the distinction between ‘direct obligations’ and ‘mere adverse repercussions’
holds the key to a proper understanding of this jurisprudence. In other words,
this distinction ought to be seen as the central demarcation line between ad-
missible and prohibited instances of invocability of directives.
Secondly, we showed how the various theories on the direct effect of direct-
ives—as summarized in Section II—fail to appreciate the distinction between
‘direct obligations’ and ‘mere adverse repercussions’. Consequently, although
some theories have more explanatory power vis-a`-vis the case law than others,
none of them is capable of providing a watertight description of all the relevant
judgments in horizontal and inverse vertical situations. Even in their most ac-
curate formulations, all theories are ultimately based on conceptions of the
distinction between ‘directly imposing an obligation’ and ‘entailing mere ad-
verse repercussions’ that are irreconcilable with the case law and its rationale.
Thirdly we offered a descriptively accurate and, arguably, normatively desir-
able doctrinal construction of the case law. According to our normative impact
theory, the limits to the direct effect of directives are defined by the impact of
invoking a norm of a directive on the norms directly governing the dispute.
Thus, the prohibitions of inverse vertical and horizontal direct effect of direct-
ives are conceptualized as a prohibition to invoke a norm from an unimple-
mented directive insofar as this would change the norms which directly apply to
the dispute at hand. This is because such a change in the applicable legal
framework entails a direct obligation onto the (other) individual. Whether this
change is the result of substitution or exclusionary effects is, in this respect,
irrelevant. In contrast, invoking a norm from an unimplemented directive does
not create a direct obligation for another individual insofar as this invocation
affects a norm different from the one imposing a positive or negative obligation
upon this individual. In such cases, direct effect leads to a change in the factual
circumstances which precede the norms in which an obligation is imposed upon
an individual. In other words, it leads to mere adverse repercussions.
This approach reconciles the alleged inconsistencies in the case law of the ECJ
from the perspective of the substitution–exclusion theory, while remaining in
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keep with the normative validity of the relationship between primacy, on the one
hand, and legality and legal certainty, on the other. Not only does the normative
impact theory succeed in explaining the relevant case law of the Court—includ-
ing CIA Security, Unilever, Pfeiffer, and Berlusconi—we submit that it is also
normatively more sound than existing theories such as the substitution–exclu-
sion theory.
Lastly, we situated this doctrinal construction in the context of the prelimin-
ary reference procedure to explain the allegedly remaining anomalies in the case
law. The question of direct effect ought to be explicitly raised by the referring
national court so as to be part of the preliminary reference procedure. Moreover,
the Court appears to proceed on the basis of a presumption of the possibility of
consistent interpretation in the absence of concrete evidence to the contrary.
Whilst this is understandable from the perspective of the functioning of Article
267 TFEU, this presumption has not been formulated explicitly by the Court to
the detriment of doctrinal clarity. Nonetheless, the presumption of the possi-
bility of consistent interpretation is essential to elucidate the existing case law
and, more importantly, to understand the scope and meaning of future judg-
ments in cases having an (implicit) direct effect dimension.
The importance of a comprehensive theory on the invocability of EU law
transcends the case of directives. We urge the Court to discuss the limits to the
invocability of EU norms explicitly. The normative impact theory may help to








/yel/article-abstract/doi/10.1093/yel/yez004/5543611 by guest on 06 April 2020
